The First Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate by Magarian, Gregory P.
Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Year 2004
The First Amendment, The
Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of
Wartime Political Debate
Gregory P. Magarian
Villanova University School of Law, magarian@law.villanova.edu
This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art6
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION, AND 
NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME POLITICAL 
DEBATE
BY GREGORY P. MAGARIAN1
DRAFT 5-12-04
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
I. CONFRONTING NONGOVERNMENTAL 
CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN WARTIME.................. 5
A. The Value and Vulnerability of Wartime
Political Debate ........................................................................... 5
1.  The Historical Vulnerability of Wartime
Political Debate to Nongovernmental
Suppression ....................................................................... 5
2. The Public Rights Theory of Expressive
Freedom and the Necessity of Robust Political
Debate for Democratic Self-Government........................ 11
B. Nongovernmental Censorship of Political Speech
During the “War on Terrorism” ............................................... 18
1. Misinformation and Suppression of 
Information by News Media ............................................ 19
2. Exclusions of Political Speakers from
Privately Owned Public Spaces. ..................................... 24
3. Reprisals Against Political Expression ........................... 28
II. FROM PRIVATE SPHERE TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY............... 31
A. The Public-Private Distinction in Action................................... 33
1. The State Action Doctrine ............................................... 33
2. Normative Defenses......................................................... 36
B. Three Stages of Criticizing the Public-Private
Distinction.................................................................................. 42
1. Denial:  The Ontological Critique .................................. 42
2. Anger:  Ideological Critiques.......................................... 46
3. Acceptance:  Rehabilitating the Public-Private
Distinction ....................................................................... 52
C. Developing a Useful Role for the Public-Private
Distinction in Constitutional Adjudication ................................ 54
III. APPLYING THE PUBLIC RIGHTS FIRST AMENDMENT
TO NONGOVERNAMENTAL CENSORSHIP OF
1 Associate Professor, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks to Michelle 
Anderson, Mike Carroll, Steve Chanenson, Marisa Cianciarulo, Anuj Desai, and workshop 
participants at Boston College Law School and Pace University School of Law for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.
2WARTIME POLITICAL DEBATE .................................................... 60
A. The Role of Personal Integrity in Applying the
Public Rights First Amendment ................................................. 60
B. Enjoining Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime
Political Debate ......................................................................... 66
1. Exclusions of Political Speakers from Privately
Owned Public Spaces ...................................................... 66
2. Reprisals Against Political Expression ........................... 72
3. Misinformation and Suppression of 
Information by News Media ............................................ 75
C. Why the Court? .......................................................................... 81
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 87
INTRODUCTION
On a Monday evening in March 2003, as the nation wrestled with the 
painful questions whether and on what terms to go to war against Iraq, a 
60 year-old man named Stephen Downs walked into a t-shirt shop in the 
busy Crossgates shopping mall near Albany, New York.  He bought a 
custom made shirt with “Peace on Earth” written across the front and 
“Give Peace a Chance” across the back.  He paid for the shirt, put it on, 
and walked to the mall’s food court to eat dinner.  Two people noticed the 
shirt and complimented Downs, but no one else seemed to pay much 
attention.  Shortly after he sat down to eat, a security guard approached, 
told Downs that he was causing a disturbance, and ordered him to remove 
the shirt or leave the mall.  Downs politely refused.  Mall security then 
called local police, who repeated the command that Downs remove the 
shirt or leave the mall.  When Downs again refused, the police arrested 
him for trespass.2
Except for the restrained language of Downs’ shirt, his antiwar 
protest replicated Paul Cohen’s famous 1968 stroll through the Los 
Angeles County Courthouse with the legend “Fuck the Draft” 
emblazoned on his jacket.  Both men sought to express opposition to a 
divisive, high-stakes military action.  Both made their protests by wearing 
their messages in prominent hubs of community life.  Cohen’s arrest for 
disturbing the peace led to perhaps the Supreme Court’s most eloquent 
affirmation of the value and sanctity of political protest under the First 
Amendment.3  No competent attorney, however, would have cited the 
First Amendment in defense of Downs’ nearly identical action.  Although 
both Cohen and Downs made their protests in public gathering places, 
Downs chose a site owned by a private entity.  From the standpoint of 
constitutional doctrine, the awesome force of the First Amendment 
dissipates before any assault from a nongovernmental censor.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and ensuing events have 
compelled the federal government to evaluate numerous complex policy
questions.  Not in at least the past three decades has the United States had 
to make such momentous decisions about whether and to what extent to 
use military force in pursuit of the national interest.  These policy 
quandaries have spurred rich and intense political debate among the 
American people.  Our discourse, however, has not gone unimpeded.  The 
government itself has at times discouraged public debate, most 
2 See Nicole F. Barr, T-shirt Redux, Charge To Be Dropped: Food Court Frenzy 
Protests Arrests, THE ENTERPRISE (Albany County, N.Y.), March 6, 2003, p. 1, 18.  When the 
Downs arrest generated nationwide publicity, mall officials quietly dropped the charges, 
even as the mall became a magnet for antiwar protesters and civil libertarians.  See id.; 
Melissa Hale Spencer, Supporters’ Eat-in: Downs Tastes Victory, THE ENTERPRISE, March 
13, 2003, p. 1.  The mall, however, continued to maintain that its private status allowed it 
to bar expressive activity.  See Molly Belmont, Free Speech! Bill Would Lift Mall Gag, THE 
ENTERPRISE, April 3, 2003, p. 1, 21.
3 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
2notoriously through Attorney General Ashcroft’s declaration that 
criticism of the Bush Administrations antiterrorist policies “gives 
ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends”4 and 
Presidential Press Secretary Ari Fleischer’s citing negative reactions to a 
statement critical of the U.S. military as “reminders to all Americans that 
they need to watch what they say, watch what they do.”5
Such government pressure against political debate should trouble us, 
but it can hardly surprise us.  Our expectation that the government will 
try to suppress speech is manifest in our deeply ingrained understanding 
of the First Amendment’s guarantee of expressive freedom.  On that 
understanding, the Framers of the Constitution designed the First 
Amendment to shield individuals’ decisions whether to speak and what to 
say against governmental censorship and punishment.  The surprising 
feature of impediments to expression during the present national crisis is 
that suppression of important political debate has resulted far less often 
from official action than from nongovernmental behavior.  Stephen 
Downs’ arrest in the Crossgates Mall was just one manifestation of a 
wave of censorship of political debate that has included not only denials 
to protesters of access to property but also suppression of information by 
the news media and institutional retaliation against dissenters.  During the 
Iraq war, for example, the major media refused to show wrenching 
images of Iraqi casualties and American prisoners of war.6  National stock 
exchanges barred some business reporters from their trading floor as 
punishment for their networks’ war reporting.7  These and numerous 
similar nongovernmental actions have dramatically impeded public 
discourse since the September 11 attacks.
Political debate in times of war and national emergency lies at the 
core of First Amendment concern, because such crises make debate both 
especially vulnerable and especially valuable.  Wartime debate is 
especially vulnerable to suppression because of war’s most positive by-
product – its unification of the nation behind a common purpose.  With or
without actual government censorship, broad support for government 
policy encourages the silencing of wartime dissidents.  Wartime debate is 
especially valuable because of war’s most awful consequences.  Wars kill 
people, topple governments, and scar survivors and the ecosystems they 
4 Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The Senate Hearing; Ashcroft Defends 
Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, p. A1.  To 
leave no doubt about his attitude toward dissenters, the Attorney General added: “To those 
who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics 
only aid terrorists.”  Id.
5 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Sept. 26, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010926-5.html.  
Fleischer was commenting on television commentator Bill Maher’s remark that flying an 
airplane into a building on a suicide mission took more courage than pushing a button to 
fire a missile.  See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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inhabit.  In no other context can government error or malfeasance do 
greater harm.  A democratic system entrusts the people with ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that government acts wisely.  Because wars 
and national emergencies require the government to act quickly and 
decisively, wartime political discourse must be informed, vigorous, and 
unimpeded.   The conventional understanding of the First Amendment as 
applying only to government action, however, renders the Constitution 
powerless to protect wartime debate against nongovernmental 
suppression.
We can, and should, understand the First Amendment differently.  
This article contends that courts should invoke the First Amendment to 
enjoin behavior by nongovernmental institutions that undermines public 
debate on matters of national policy.  The argument builds on an 
approach to the constitutional freedom of expression rooted in the 
democracy-centered First Amendment paradigm of Alexander 
Meiklejohn,8 an approach I have called the public rights theory of 
expressive freedom.9  Part I of this article establishes the special 
importance of protecting political debate in times of war and national 
emergency.  The first section invokes familiar historical examples to 
establish the vulnerability of wartime debate to suppression by powerful 
nongovernmental entities.  It then explains the necessity under the public 
rights theory of informed, active public debate for wise governmental 
action.  The second section catalogues the many instances of 
nongovernmental censorship since the September 11 attacks, using 
contemporary circumstances to illustrate nongovernmental institutions’ 
strong tendency to enforce government policy and majority will during 
times of war and national emergency.
Part II assesses the primary legal doctrine that blocks courts from 
enjoining private censorship: the public-private distinction in 
constitutional law.  The first section of Part II maps the arguments and 
priorities that support the public-private distinction.  The second section 
surveys critiques that have branded the distinction incoherent and 
ideologically driven.  Despite the force of these critiques, the public-
private distinction persists in our constitutional jurisprudence, indicating 
that it must harbor some essential truth.  Accordingly, the final section of 
Part II seeks to accommodate the public-private distinction to a proper 
focus on the substance of constitutional rights.  It concludes that the 
integrity of natural persons, rather than the abstract idea of “the private,” 
should inform adjudication of rights controversies.  The public-private 
8 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19-21 (1948).  For a discussion of 
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory, see infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
9 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First 
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1972-90 (2003) (describing public rights theory).
4distinction, recast along these lines, serves normative theories of rights by 
guaranteeing individuals the degree of decisional autonomy they need in 
order to effectuate their rights.
Part III applies the foregoing insights about the public-private 
distinction to the First Amendment in the context of nongovernmental 
suppression of wartime political debate.  The first section explains that 
the public rights theory of expressive freedom requires a zone of personal 
autonomy, insulated from constitutional oversight, to allow individuals to 
evaluate information and formulate political positions.  That sort of 
private preserve, however, provides no constitutional safe harbor for 
institutional attacks on wartime debate.  The second section contends that 
courts should invoke the First Amendment to enjoin many 
nongovernmental exclusions of political speakers from expressive 
opportunities and reprisals against wartime dissenters.  The news media 
present special concerns under the public rights theory that justify 
insulating journalists’ editorial decisions from judicial oversight, but 
courts can apply the First Amendment indirectly to media-generated 
constraints on democratic discourse by assertively reviewing regulations 
that facilitate concentrated control of media outlets.  The final section 
responds to practical concerns about empowering federal courts to enjoin 
nongovernmental suppression of political debate.
This article advocates a bold departure from received First 
Amendment wisdom and fundamentally reconceives the distinction 
between public and private that sits at the heart of constitutional doctrine.  
My thesis swims against a strong current of opposition to constitutional 
limits on private behavior.  That opposition, however, presumes that 
autonomy for nongovernmental institutions is necessary to protect 
freedom.  It carries little force where, as in the circumstances I describe, 
those institutions compromise freedom.
I. CONFRONTING NONGOVERNMENTAL CENSORSHIP 
OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN WARTIME
A. The Value and Vulnerability of Wartime Political 
Debate
My thesis, that courts should apply the First Amendment to enjoin 
nongovernmental suppression of political debate in times of war and 
national emergency, depends on two premises.  First, nongovernmental 
actions threaten political debate in a meaningful way.  Second, during 
periods of war and national emergency – for which I will use the 
shorthand “wartime” – political debate is especially important for the 
common good.  The first section of this part defends those premises.  It 
demonstrates the prevalence of nongovernmental suppression of speech 
and invokes a few historical examples to illustrate nongovernmental 
institutions’ propensity to suppress wartime political debate.  It then 
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employs First Amendment theory to establish the cost of muting political 
debate and to explain why that cost is especially great in wartime.  The 
second section brings these observations into the present by cataloguing 
nongovernmental actors’ many, varied, and damaging assaults on political 
debate since the September 11 terrorist attacks.  The article proceeds, in 
Part II, to examine and critique the Constitution’s supposed incapacity to
address this problem and, in Part III, to propose a way of overcoming that 
incapacity. 
1. The Historical Vulnerability of Wartime Political
Debate to Nongovernmental Suppression
Governments have constant motives to suppress speech, because 
people routinely use their expressive freedom to criticize the government 
or its interests.  As a consequence, received cultural and legal wisdom 
teach us to beware government interference with speech.  Judicial 
responses to acts of government censorship fill the United States Reports 
and consume treatises on the First Amendment.  In contrast, the Supreme 
Court rarely acknowledges nongovernmental authorities’ capacity and 
enthusiasm for suppressing speech.10  Our intuitive ground for fearing 
government censorship, however, reveals the risk of nongovernmental 
suppression of speech as well.  In a society where formidable private 
entities exercise a great deal of influence over people’s lives, individuals 
have grounds for questioning and criticizing nongovernmental as well as 
governmental conduct.  For this reason, powerful nongovernmental 
entities frequently take legal action to silence expression that threatens 
their interests, notably through strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPP suits),11 intellectual property claims,12 and other 
10 The most notable exceptions include Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding, based on capacity of corporations to convert economic wealth 
into expressive capital, state statute that limited corporations’ political expenditures); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding FCC regulations that required 
broadcasters to provide equal time for opposing political positions constitutional and in the 
public interest); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) (invoking First 
Amendment to limit liability for alleged defamation of public officials).
11 SLAPP suits are devices by which land developers and other powerful interests use 
tort claims to silence opponents of their economic activities.  See generally Alice Glover & 
Marcus Jimison, SLAPP Suits: A First Amendment Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 
122 (1995) (describing phenomenon of SLAPP suits as a threat to expressive freedom and 
discussing legislative solutions).
12 Corporations frequently use copyright claims to censor or punish expression, 
including important political speech.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (affirming finding of copyright violation against magazine 
for publishing account of Nixon pardon from President Ford’s autobiography).  For an 
account of varied corporate uses of aggressive copyright, see Robert S. Boynton, The 
Tyranny of Copryright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, p. 40 (magazine). 
6assertions that their common law or statutory rights trump their 
opponents’ expressive interests.13
The threat of nongovernmental suppression of political debate 
intensifies during times of war and national emergency, when citizens 
literally and figuratively tend to “rally ’round the flag.”  Powerful voices 
call for citizens to set aside differences in deference to the common 
national cause.14  In these circumstances, the national government itself 
enjoys a freer hand to restrict speech.  Paradoxically, however, taking the 
risk of constitutional sanction inherent in suppressing speech may make 
less sense for the government in wartime than under normal 
circumstances, despite courts’ notorious squeamishness about overriding 
elected officials’ decisions during times of war and national emergency.15
If the government censors political debate in wartime, it risks inflaming 
dissenters and fracturing the sense of national unity.16  Fortuitously for 
government, it need not take that risk.  Many nongovernmental 
institutions willingly squelch speech critical of government policies in 
wartime, whether motivated by sincere animus against dissenters, desire 
to curry favor with customers, or interest in the benefits wartime 
economic and military initiatives can bring to industry.17  Our nation’s 
13 Records of actual litigation understate the force of nongovernmental suppression of 
speech, because the mere threat of litigation often silences speakers who lack the means to 
fight back in court.  In late 2002, for example, a left-wing group called the Yes Men marked 
the anniversary of the catastrophic Union Carbide toxic gas leak in Bhopal, India by 
circulating a mock press release from Dow Chemical, Union Carbide’s parent corporation.  
Dow then threatened litigation against Verio, the upstream Internet access provider that 
leased space to the Yes Men’s smaller service provider, Thing.net.  Verio reacted by 
shutting down the entire Thing network, which housed 255 other Internet addresses 
besides the Yes Men, and it subsequently terminated Thing.net’s contract.  See C. Carr, 
Dow v. Thing: A Free Speech Infringement That’s Worse Than Censorship, VILLAGE VOICE, 
Jan. 17, 2003, p. 49. 
14 See Cecilia O’Leary and Tony Platt, Pledging Allegiance: The Revival of Prescriptive 
Patriotism, in PHIL SCRATON ED., BEYOND SEPTEMBER 11: AN ANTHOLOGY OF DISSENT 173, 
173 (2002) (describing, in wake of September 11 attacks, “a new wave of orchestrated 
patriotism . . . aimed at closing down debate and dissent through the imposition of a 
prescribed allegiance”).
15 Examples of this phenomenon in the Supreme Court include Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (affirming President’s prerogatives in negotiating end to Iranian 
hostage crisis); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (rejecting constitutional 
challenge to military’s internment of Japanese Americans during World War II); 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (same); and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 
25 (1942) (declining to second-guess military’s determinations regarding combatant status 
in World War II);  but see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(holding Executive Order seizing steel mills during Korean War beyond President’s powers 
and therefore unconstitutional).  A recent analogue is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (urging district court to act cautiously when reviewing military’s decisions made 
during military conflict).
16 See Diane L. Zimmerman, “Private” War: The Problem of Access, in SHIMON 
SHETREET ED., FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 181, 181 (1991) (suggesting that 
government suppression of wartime dissent may undermine public support for war).
17 See David Whyte, Business as Usual?  Corporate Moralism and the ‘War Against 
Terrorism,’ in SCRATON, supra note 14, at 150, 154-56 (describing potential benefits for 
business of post-September 11 U.S. economic policies and war in Afghanistan).
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history provides numerous examples of nongovernmental authorities’ zeal 
for clamping down on wartime political debate.
Reprisals for past or perceived political affiliations are a familiar 
form of censorship during wartime.  The most familiar examples are the 
Red Scares that occurred during the uneasy periods following the two 
World Wars.  Government officials in these two periods played a 
prominent role in purging alleged communists from the civil service, 
academia, and the arts.  The federal government prosecuted political 
dissenters during World War I,18 and after the war Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer set a tone of intimidation by authorizing violent raids 
against radical groups.19  Beginning in the late 1940s, Senator Joseph 
McCarthy20 and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)21
sought to ferret out subversives both in the government and among 
nongovernmental professionals.  
Much of the ruinous political intimidation in these periods, however, 
resulted from voluntary, even enthusiastic nongovernmental behavior.  
The infamous Hollywood blacklist evolved from film industry leaders’ 
decision in 1947 to fire the so-called Hollywood Ten, the initial group of 
screenwriters and directors tarred as communists, in order to avert an 
amorphous danger of public outcry and boycotts.22  Over the next decade, 
movie studios fired numerous directors, writers, and actors because of 
real or alleged communist associations.  Studio bosses destroyed the 
careers even of people whose only crime was to support organizations 
that opposed the blacklists23 or to sign briefs and petitions on behalf of 
alleged communists.24  Other actual or suspected political radicals lost 
their jobs in industries from manufacturing25 to the news media26 to 
18 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The American Experience: Free Speech and National 
Security, in SHETREET, supra note 16, at 10, 13-15 (describing prosecutions of antiwar 
activists during World War I).
19 See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE
41-43 (1990) (describing federal government’s role in 1919-1920 Red Scare).
20 See generally id. at 120-43 (describing Sen. McCarthy’s leadership of anticommunist 
frenzy from 1950-1954).
21 See id. at 150-61 (describing HUAC investigations and hearings in early 1950s).
22 See LARRY COPLAIR & STEVEN ENGLUND, THE INQUISITION IN HOLLYWOOD: POLITICS 
IN THE FILM COMMUNITY 1930-1960 at 328-31 (1980) (describing November 1947 meeting of 
studio heads that decided fate of Hollywood Ten).
23 See id. at 394-95 (discussing studios’ persecution of artists for membership in 
organizations that fought blacklist).
24 See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN 
AND EISENHOWER 497 (1978) (describing film industry reprisals against actors and others 
who signed petitions or amicus briefs that defended accused colleagues or advocated 
political and expressive freedoms).
25 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 151 (describing automobile body manufacturer’s 
suspension of two workers after their testimony at a HUAC hearing prompted work 
stoppage by other employees).
8private academia.27  Even Harvard University, a cornerstone of liberal 
American academia, declared in 1953 that academic freedom did not 
include the right to be a communist, and as late as 1957 the university’s 
president declared that no communist should serve on a university 
faculty.28  Professional associations, from the Screen Actors’ and 
Directors’ Guilds29 to the American Bar and Medical associations30 to the 
American Federation of Teachers,31 vigorously assisted in purging actual 
and suspected communists from their respective professions.
The business of ferreting out alleged communists became a model of 
free enterprise.  In Hollywood, leading figures such as writer-director 
Elia Kazan and actor Sterling Hayden fingered friends and associates as 
communists in order to advance their own careers.32  Numerous other 
Hollywood luminaries helped themselves by offering congressional 
investigators extravagant accounts of communist influence in the 
movies.33  Professional blacklisters – led by American Business 
Consultants, publisher of a compendium of left-wing industry figures 
called Red Channels – unearthed and published information about film 
artists’ political activities and allegiances and then offered to “clear” 
suspects of communist ties – essentially a protection racket.34 Red 
Channels became required reading for film and television producers and 
advertisers, many of whom cravenly abandoned performers the booklet 
listed in order to avoid bad publicity.35  In like manner, painters and 
sculptors marginalized by the avant-garde fanned fears of communism in 
order to encourage ideological attacks on their modernist colleagues.36
26 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 449-52 (describing firings by newspapers and 
American Newspaper Guild of employees who had communist ties or had invoked Fifth 
Amendment rights in government investigations).
27 See, e.g., id. at 410-11 (describing suspension and forced resignation of M.I.T. 
professors who admitted past communist ties); id. at 415-16 (describing politically 
motivated dismissals of professors at Columbia and New York Universities).
28 See id. at 411-13 (describing Harvard’s responses to 1950s Red Scare). 
29 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 154-55 (describing anticommunist activities of film 
guilds).
30 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 403 (describing role of major professional associations 
in anticommunist purges).
31 See id. at 405-06 (describing A.F.T.’s refusal to defend teachers who declined to deny 
membership in Communist Party).
32 See COPLAIR & ENGLUND, supra note 22, at 377-78 (recounting Kazan’s and 
Hayden’s admissions that they had consigned others to blacklist in order to avoid 
blacklisting themselves).
33 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 492-93 (describing testimony before Congress of 
Hollywood figures including Ronald Reagan, Adolphe Menjou, and Walt Disney).
34 See COPLAIR & ENGLUND, supra note 22, at 386-87 (describing private organizations 
that used information to facilitate and profit from blacklist); FRIED, supra note 19, at 156-57 
(describing activities of professional blacklisters).
35 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 521-23 (describing interactions among professional 
blacklisters, producers, and advertising executives).
36 See FRIED, supra note 19, at 30 (describing anticommunist crusades in visual arts).
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Economic self-interest on the part of both employers37 and ambitious 
union officials38 led to purges of communists in the labor movement 
during both Red Scares.39
The possibility or reality of war often has undermined public debate 
in another less direct but arguably even more damaging way: by 
prompting the news media to forego aggressive, critical newsgathering 
and reporting in exchange for sycophantic or cynical acquiescence to 
official policy.  As in the matter of reprisals against perceived political 
opponents, wartime governments have acted to manipulate or intimidate 
the press.  Much of the blame for the news media’s failures in wartime, 
however, falls at the media’s own feet.  Media outlets at times have seen 
financial gain in inflaming passions for war – most notoriously when 
newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst helped ignite the Spanish-
American War, through selective reporting and outright fabrications,40 in 
order to boost his papers’ circulation.41  At other times, as in the period 
leading up to the United States’ decision to join the allied cause in World 
War I, media corporations have advocated war because they believed the 
public favored that course.42  Similarly, ideology often has led the press 
to tar political dissenters with unsubstantiated charges of disloyalty, a 
powerful tactic in both the first and second Red Scares.43  In addition, 
media firms have willingly, sometimes even enthusiastically, embraced 
37 See id. at 152 (describing General Electric’s intimidation of left-wing unions during 
labor dispute in early 1950s).
38 See id. at 35 (referring to economically motivated anticommunism in labor 
movement).
39 Although anticommunist mania had abated by the time of the Vietnam War, some 
employers during that period terminated workers for antiwar activities.  See, e.g., JAMES W. 
CLINTON, THE LOYAL OPPOSITION: AMERICANS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1972 at 11 (1995) 
(presenting oral history of Harold Supriano, who lost several jobs after making factfinding 
trip to Hanoi in 1965).
40 See FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY: 1690-1960 at 527 (3d 
ed. 1962) (noting that Hearst papers’ biased reporting even “swept blindly over the last-
minute capitulation by Spain on all the points at issue”); W.A. SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST: 
A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST 110 (1961) (stating that Hearst reporters and 
other U.S. journalists in Cuba “published accounts of battles that never occurred” and 
“narrated a succession of Spanish atrocities entirely unauthenticated”). 
41 See MOTT, supra note 40, at 531-32 (discussing economic motivation for Hearst’s 
pro-war reporting); SWANBERG, supra note 40, at 108 (same).
42 See MOTT, supra note 40, at 616 (describing U.S. newspapers that advocated entry 
into World War I as taking their cues from prevailing public opinion).  The press’ role in 
encouraging U.S. entry into World War I also reflected British manipulation of American 
war correspondents.  See PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: FROM THE CRIMEA TO 
VIETNAM: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 122 (1975) 
(describing effect of British propaganda on U.S. public opinion).
43 See CAUTE, supra note 24, at 446-49 (describing newspapers’ trumpeting of 
innuendoes about citizens’ alleged communist ties during late 1940s and early 1950s); 
FRIED, supra note 19, at 40-41 (describing newspapers’ red baiting of left-wing union 
leaders during 1919-1920 Red Scare).
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constraints on their battlefield reporting. 44
Everyone should care about nongovernmental reprisals against 
wartime political dissenters and the media’s failures to assess government 
policy critically because those actions threaten the national interest.  
Informed, open political debate is essential to a well-functioning 
democratic system, especially when wars and national emergencies 
increase the stakes of policy decisions.45  Understanding the danger that 
suppression of speech, whether initiated by the government or not, poses 
to our system requires analysis of why expressive freedom stands at the 
heart of our constitutional order.  That analysis implicates First 
Amendment theory, and particularly a theoretical explanation of the First 
Amendment’s speech protection that I have labeled the public rights 
theory of expressive freedom.  
2.  The Public Rights Theory of Expressive Freedom and 
the Necessity of Robust Political Debate for Democratic Self-
Government
The dominant theory of expressive freedom in American law, which I 
have called the private rights theory,46 reflects no special concern for 
political debate or dissent.  That theory explains constitutional expressive 
freedom as intended to safeguard individual autonomy by protecting the act 
of speaking.  Under the private rights theory, the First Amendment affords a 
formal, negative shield against government action that limits any speech, 
subject to balancing against the government’s competing regulatory interests.  
The theory assigns no particular weight to speech aimed at influencing 
government policy; rather, it emphasizes the value of self-interested 
expression.47  In contrast, an overriding emphasis on the rights of political 
dissenters emerges from the private rights theory’s major rival, the public 
rights theory.48  The public rights theory treats the First Amendment as 
protecting not individuals’ interests in autonomy but the political 
44 See KNIGHTLEY, supra  note 42, at 123-24 (describing U.S. military efforts to control 
war correspondents’ reports during World War I); id. at 274-76, 317-30 (describing military 
censorship of correspondents during World War II); id. at 381-82 (describing U.S. 
government’s disinformation strategies during Vietnam War).  For a description of recent 
media acquiescence in military controls beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, see infra notes 
104-06 and accompanying text.
45 See JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE 
POWER vii (1999) (positing harm to democratic decisionmaking from government’s tendency 
to suppress political debate during wartime); Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and 
Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 444 
(2002) (contending that aggressive government investigations that discredit political 
dissenters “undermine the effectiveness of popular self-government”).
46 For a thorough explanation of the private rights theory, see Magarian, supra note 9, 
at 1947-59.
47 See id. at 1953-54 (describing pluralist and individuated character of expressive 
freedom under private rights theory).
48 For a thorough explanation of the public rights theory, see id. at 1972-91. 
NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME 
DEBATE
11
community’s interest in informed, broadly participatory policymaking.  It 
views the Amendment as a substantive guarantor of a positive value: open, 
robust democratic discourse.  Expressive freedom, under the public rights 
theory, means more than shielding formal opportunities for expression 
against government interference; it means ensuring that vigorous debate 
about policy matters actually takes place.49
The public rights theory has its roots in the seminal writings of 
Alexander Meiklejohn.  Based on his view that the absolutist language of the 
First Amendment required some substantive limitation in the Amendment’s 
scope,50 Meiklejohn contends that we should understand the First 
Amendment as protecting only speech necessary to the democratic process, 
thereby ensuring “that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing 
because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.”51   Meiklejohn 
defends this choice on the ground that self-government is the essential object 
of the Constitution.52  While the limitation to political speech leaves 
Meiklejohn open to cogent criticism for consigning much important speech 
to the dubious mercies of the political majority,53 it allows him and his 
inheritors to advocate comprehensive protection for speech with a substantial 
claim to centrality in the constitutional scheme.  Meiklejohn’s First 
Amendment theory emphasizes the interest not of the speaker, but of the 
listener.  His concern is “not that everyone shall speak, but that everything 
worth saying be said.”54  This emphasis reflects the underlying purpose that 
Meiklejohn identifies with the First Amendment: wise, informed deliberation 
in the service of democratic self-government.  “[C]onflicting views may be 
expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but because they 
are relevant.”55
Political dissent stands at the core of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment.  He 
sharply criticizes Justice Holmes’ initial conception of the “clear and present 
danger” test, which allowed criminalization of subversive advocacy in 
wartime.56  “Taken literally,” warns Meiklejohn of Holmes’ formulation, “it 
49 See id. at 1983-85 (discussing substantive nature of expressive freedom under public 
rights theory).
50 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 19-21 (positing paradox of First Amendment’s 
scope).
51 Id. at 26-27.
52 See id. at 27 (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of 
the program of self-government.”).
53 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596-
97 (1982) (criticizing narrow focus of Meiklejohn’s First Amendment theory).  For a 
discussion of Meiklejohn’s eventual expansion of his concept of political speech, see infra
notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
54 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 26.
55 Id. at 28.
56 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  The original “clear and 
present danger” test still cast a long shadow at the time Meiklejohn wrote.  As recently as 
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means that in all ‘dangerous’ situations, minorities, however law-abiding and 
loyal, must be silent.”57  Meiklejohn forthrightly accepts the danger that 
unfettered political speech might destroy the very system that protects it, 
invoking with admiration Holmes’ later dissent in Gitlow v. New York:58 “If, 
in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined 
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning 
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their 
way.”59  For Meiklejohn, that sentiment embodies “Americanism.”60  He 
celebrates dissent because he insists unpopular viewpoints, by virtue of their 
variance with accepted wisdom, make a singularly valuable contribution to 
informed political decisionmaking in a democratic society.61  Meiklejohn’s 
position emulates the Supreme Court’s greatest statement on the necessity of 
dissent, Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney v. California:62 “Men 
feared witches and burnt women.  It is the function of speech to free men 
from the bondage of irrational fears.”63
Meiklejohn’s approach to the First Amendment has received vital 
elaboration from subsequent theorists.  Most notably, Owen Fiss64 and Cass 
Sunstein65 have urged approaches to the First Amendment that focus on 
substantive political debate as the democratic bottom line of expressive 
freedom.  Fiss argues forcefully for the value of activist government in 
sustaining the conditions needed for democratic discourse.66  Sunstein 
mounts a two-layered, civic republican argument for a First Amendment 
theory that would either focus on the results of expressive freedom 
controversies for democratic deliberation67 or simply give primacy to 
political speech.68   Their rhetoric, however, nowhere matches the force of 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court took a highly permissive position on 
punishment of subversive advocacy.  Not until Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), 
would the Court fully abandon the “clear and present danger” formulation in favor of the 
much more speech-protective incitement test.
57 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 44.
58 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
59 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted in MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 42).
60 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 43.
61 Id. at 28 (“When a question of policy is ‘before the house,’ free men choose to meet it 
not with their eyes shut, but with their eyes open.  To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be 
unfit for self-government.”).
62 274 U.S. 357.
63 Id. at 376; see also id. at 375 (ascribing to founding generation the belief “that the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people”).
64 See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, 
Why the State?); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 
(1986) (hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure).
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) (hereinafter 
Sunstein, Free Speech).
66 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 781-83 (offering New Deal 
regulation of economic activity as basis for allowing some government regulation of 
expressive activity).
67 See Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 263-300.
68 See id. at 301-15.
NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME 
DEBATE
13
Meiklejohn’s special concern with suppression of political dissent.  Rather, 
in advocating a shift in First Amendment priorities, both Fiss and Sunstein 
focus more on what they see the First Amendment as improperly protecting –
corporate license, special access for the wealthy to means of expression, 
pornography – than on what they see it as failing sufficiently to protect.69
They worry more about misallocations of expressive opportunities than about 
outright suppression of dissenting positions.70  Given that Fiss and Sunstein 
made their contributions to the public rights theory in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a period marked by relative peace and prosperity, their focus on 
distributive injustices rather than blatant censorship makes perfect sense.
In contrast, Meiklejohn wrote his essays on the First Amendment forty 
years earlier, at the height of the second Red Scare’s asphyxiation of political 
debate.  Meiklejohn, in fact, actively resisted the anticommunist purge, 
coauthoring a Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of the Hollywood Ten 
in 194971 and assailing the ACLU’s condemnation of the Communist Party 
in 1953.72  He witnessed firsthand the federal judiciary’s failure to protect 
political debate from the tide of anticommunist political correctness.73  In 
perhaps the most passionate words he ever wrote, Meiklejohn situated his 
First Amendment theory
[i]n these wretched days of postwar and, it may be, of 
prewar, hysterical brutality, when we Americans, from the 
president down, are seeking to thrust back Communist belief 
by jailing its advocates, by debarring them from office, by 
expelling them from the country, by hating them . . .74
Similarly overt threats to dissenters in the wartime, postwar, and prewar 
years of the early 20th Century formed the context for Justices Holmes’ and 
Brandeis’ initial development of the Supreme Court’s modern First 
69 See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 788 (positing that “the market brings to 
bear on editorial and programming decisions factors that might have a great deal to do with 
profitability or allocative efficiency . . . but little to do with the democratic needs of the
electorate); Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 258 (criticizing shift in attention of 
First Amendment discourse from less powerful to extremely powerful claimants).
70 Indeed, Fiss contrasts his theoretical concerns with what he characterizes as First 
Amendment theory’s foundational focus on the street corner speaker.  See Fiss, Social 
Structure, supra note 64, at 1408-11.  That Fiss associates the image of the street corner 
speaker with an ideal of autonomy rather than of dissent, going so far as to portray 
Meiklejohn as having emphasized autonomy, see id. at 1410-11, tells a great deal about the 
differences between the divergent historical contexts of Meiklejohn and Fiss.
71 See ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN 1872-1964, at 275-76 (2001) (summarizing Meiklejohn’s brief).
72 See id. at 283-84.
73 See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 393, 397 & n.30 
(1988) (describing Supreme Court’s rejection in 1950s of First Amendment challenges to 
elements of anticommunist purges) (hereinafter Horwitz, Rights).
74 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 43.
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Amendment jurisprudence.75  The first decade of our new century, with its 
climate of polarized mass sentiment against a deeply frightening 
international threat, bears striking similarities to the ages that inspired these 
thinkers to emphasize the necessity of protecting dissent.  As in those ages, 
pundits today argue that the presence of an international threat transforms 
political dissent into a species of treason.76  Meiklejohn’s analysis of the First 
Amendment, however, provides a compelling account of why our nation 
needs dissent most deeply when the dangers we face are gravest. 
History bears out Meiklejohn’s emphasis on the value of dissent and 
open political discourse.  The anticommunist purges described above, 
today a source of national embarrassment, sustained themselves largely 
by their attacks on dissenting voices.77  The antiwar and civil rights 
movements of the 1960s provide the most prominent instances in recent 
American history of the ability of popular, grassroots dissenters to spur 
crucial policy changes.78  Over the past decade, emerging democracies’ 
emphasis on creating avenues for dissent and debate has underscored the 
necessity of vigorous political discourse for a healthy democratic 
system.79
Why have open debate and dissent proved so indispensable?  
75 The seminal First Amendment opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis came in 
cases that involved either antiwar protest, communist advocacy, or both.  See Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (suggesting that prosecution 
under state statute based only on membership in Socialist Party would violate First 
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(contending that publication of communist materials that present no clear and present 
danger of overthrowing government was protected speech); United States ex rel. Milwaukee 
Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that allowing Postmaster broad powers to exclude from mails publications alleged 
to intend interference with military operations would violate First Amendment); id. at 436 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (same); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that state statute that banned publishing statements that urged 
resisting military recruitment violated First Amendment); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 
U.S. 204 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming conviction based on speech intended to obstruct 
recruitment); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming conviction 
for public advocacy of resistance to war with intent and effect of preventing recruiting); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (affirming, under “clear and 
present danger” test, conviction based on distribution of leaflets that urged resistance to 
draft); see also Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) (affirming 
plaintiff’s First Amendment right to publish anti-war statements in absence of direct 
advocacy of violating law).
76 As the invasion of Iraq commenced, Fox News commentator Bill O’Reilly stated: “It 
is our duty as loyal Americans to shut up once the fighting begins . . . .”  Steve Chapman, 
The Protesting Patriots, BALT. SUN, April 1, 2003, p. A11 (quoting O’Reilly).  Conservative 
activist David Horowitz expressed a similar view: “In war, some sort of basic unity against 
the enemy is necessary.  To seek to disrupt that unity is to aid the enemy.”  Dick Polman, A 
Clash Over Who Is a Patriot, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 23, 2003, p. C1 (quoting Horowitz).
77 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
78 See generally CHARLES DEBENEDETTI, AN AMERICAN ORDEAL: THE ANTIWAR 
MOVEMENT OF THE VIETNAM ERA (1990); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
EQUALITY 1954-1980 (1981).
79 See, e.g., STJEPAN MALOVIC AND GARY W. SELNOW, THE PEOPLE, PRESS, AND 
POLITICS OF CROATIA (2001).
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Deliberative polling, a system that gauges the effect of debate on 
decisionmaking, suggests that discourse about contentious issues enables 
people to formulate more independent, better grounded policy positions.80
A deliberative poll conducted at the University of Pennsylvania in early 
2003 illustrates the device in the present national crisis.  Participants in 
the Pennsylvania exercise filled out a survey about their views on various 
foreign policy questions, then spent a weekend in discussions with 
foreign policy experts and ordinary citizens.  At the end of the weekend, 
the participants revisited the survey questions.  According to their revised 
responses, more viewed Iraq as a threat, favored increased foreign aid, 
and advocated cooperation with the United Nations.  In addition, more 
participants could accurately answer factual questions about foreign 
policy.81  Debate and discussion of a wide range of views led these 
citizens to more broadly informed, more nuanced positions on a range of 
important issues.
The Pennsylvania exercise confirms longstanding insights about the 
value of open debate for wise collective decisionmaking.  In an analysis 
of recent social and political science literature on dissent, Professor 
Sunstein recounts a series of experiments by social psychologist Solomon 
Asch in which test subjects, presented with simple problems, conformed 
their responses to group pressures even to the extent of validating 
obviously incorrect responses.82  When Asch varied the experiment by 
placing one “voice of reason” within the conformist group, the test 
subjects proved more willing to deviate from group opinion and solve the 
problems correctly.83  The beneficial effects of dissent extend even to 
success in war.  Sunstein recounts the observations of a Roosevelt 
administration official who had studied the effects of political systems on 
the warmaking capacities of the nations that fought World War II.  The 
official concluded that, in spite of the apparent efficiencies of totalitarian 
political organization, democracy and expressive freedom gave the 
United States and its democratic allies an important competitive 
advantage – because public debate encouraged wise policy choices.84
Unfortunately, as discussed above,85 wars and similar periods of 
national anxiety tend to discourage the very political debate and dissent 
they render so essential.  Prior to the September 11 attacks, lessons about 
80 For a description and discussion of deliberative polling, see JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE 
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995).
81 See Michael C. Schaffer, Foreign-Policy Session Alters Group’s Views, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Jan. 14, 2003, p. A8.  For details on the project’s methodology and results, see 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/btp/nic_main.html (visited Oct. 10, 2003).
82 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 20-21 (2003).
83 See id. at 26-27.
84 See id. at 146-49. 
85 See supra section I.A.1.
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the danger of private suppression of wartime political debate seemed like 
remote footnotes to history.  The events of the past two years, however, 
have led to an incidence of nongovernmental censorship not seen since at 
least the Vietnam era, at great cost to the national interest.  The next 
section describes the most prominent instances of nongovernmental 
impediments to public political debate during the present campaign 
against international terrorism.  This narrative lays a foundation for the 
second and third parts of this article, which explain why our present 
understanding of the First Amendment fails to address nongovernmental 
suppression of political debate and advocates a changed understanding of 
constitutional law that would allow courts to rectify that failing.
B. Nongovernmental Censorship of Political Speech During 
the “War on Terrorism”
Two key events have bracketed the current U.S. initiative against 
international terrorism: the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq beginning in March 2003.  
The period defined by these two events, especially the months following 
the attacks and the months leading up to the Iraq war, has produced 
profound and pronounced divisions in public opinion in the United States.  
The federal and state governments have taken relatively few actions 
against dissenters that would trigger opportunities for judicial relief under 
the First Amendment.  Congress in the U.S.A. Patriot Act forbade 
advising “known terrorist groups,”86 a provision a District Court struck 
down on First Amendment vagueness grounds.87  Opponents also have 
challenged a provision of the Act that authorizes scrutiny of, among other 
things, library patrons’ borrowing records, thereby discouraging access to 
information that might arouse suspicion.88  Government institutions, such 
as colleges, have made some efforts to discourage debate.89  Military 
86 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A Patriot Act), H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
87 See Eric Lichtblau, Citing Free Speech, Judge Voids Part of Antiterror Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, p. A16.
88 See U.S.A Patriot Act, 115 Stat. 272 (amending Title V of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1861) to require production of “any tangible things” 
including books, records, papers and other documents in investigations regarding 
international terrorism); Associated Press, Patriot Act Draws Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
July 31, 2003, p. A3.
89 See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Professors Protest as Students Debate, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 
2003, p. A1 (reporting that “Irvine Valley College in Southern California sent faculty 
members a memo that warned them not to discuss the war unless it was specifically related 
to course material”).
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officials have tried, apparently with little success, to suppress expressions 
of concern among service members and their families about the 
reconstruction of Iraq.90  Perhaps most disturbing, numerous antiwar 
groups and other peaceful dissenters have suffered law enforcement 
infiltration and investigation, in a strategy reminiscent of Vietnam-era 
domestic spying.91  For the most part, however, government officials 
have avoided actions that might prompt First Amendment challenges.
In contrast, nongovernmental authorities have frequently and overtly 
impeded debate.  In some cases, censorship may result from concrete 
relationships between nongovernmental institutions and the government.  
Such relationships theoretically may support legally cognizable claims of 
state action, although the Court’s willingness to credit such claims is 
doubtful.92  But voluntary nongovernmental suppression of speech based 
on real or perceived self-interest is, on the conventional understanding, 
wholly private and therefore beyond the First Amendment’s reach.  The 
following discussion catalogues the most prominent instances of 
nongovernmental censorship during the present antiterrorism campaign.  
These instances fall into three principal categories: media corporations’ 
misinformation and suppression of information; bans against dissenting 
speech on private property frequented by the public; and reprisals against 
people who have previously engaged in dissent.
1. Misinformation and Suppression of Information by 
News Media
One feature of the public rights theory that has enjoyed substantial 
currency in the legal mainstream is the idea that the press – print and 
electronic – has a special capacity, and thus a special responsibility, to 
inform the public about arguable failings by the government and to 
provide information necessary for political debate.93  Never is this 
90 See Jerry Adler, Families Ask Why, Newsweek, Aug. 4, 2003, p. 30 (discussing email 
from U.S. Army commander that discouraged military family members from raising 
concerns with government or media).
91 See Michelle Goldberg, A Thousand J. Edgar Hoovers, Salon.com, Feb. 12, 2004 
(http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/12/dissent_two/index.html) 
(visited Feb. 12, 2004) (documenting infiltration and aggressive investigations of groups and 
individuals opposed to Iraq war by federal and local law enforcement agencies); Michelle 
Goldberg, Outlawing Dissent, Salon.com, Feb. 11, 2004 
(http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/index.html) 
(visited Feb. 11, 2004) (same); Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE, 
Jan. 2002, p. 9 (describing federal investigations of people and institutions who had 
expressed opposition to U.S. foreign policy or antiterrorism tactics).
92 See infra section II.A.1. (discussing state action doctrine).
93 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 554-65 (discussing relationship between Meiklejohn’s First 
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function more important than in wartime.94  Since the September 11 
attacks the American media often have performed this task assertively.  
Far too frequently, however, news organizations have gone out of their 
way to avoid presenting information that might fuel criticism of 
government policy.  Increasingly controlled by large entertainment 
corporations that strive to avoid alienating consumers and advertisers, 
national media outlets have suppressed information of potentially great 
importance for assessing government policy.  At times media outlets have 
gone farther, slanting their newsgathering and reporting to support 
dubious government assertions.  The government has encouraged some of 
these failings, but they all ultimately depend on media corporations’ 
voluntary withdrawal from vigorous newsgathering and reporting.
The 2001 terrorist attacks made Osama bin Laden a figure of intense 
interest and importance for the American public.  The al Quaeda leader 
fueled Americans’ fear and rage by issuing several videotaped messages 
that, among other things, urged Muslims to take up arms against the 
United States.  Initially, the broadcast media prominently featured bin 
Laden’s videos in prime time news reports.  On October 10, 2001, 
however, the major U.S. television networks, prodded by a request from 
National Security Adviser Condolezza Rice, promised the government 
they would not broadcast messages from bin Laden and his followers 
without at least reviewing them first.95  The Bush Administration argued 
primarily that bin Laden’s messages might contain operational signals to 
terrorists, although this suggestion rested on mere speculation and 
ignored the easy availability of bin Laden’s recordings through other 
media.96  More troubling was Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer’s dismissal 
of the tapes’ informational value as “[a]t best . . . propaganda, calling on 
people to kill Americans.”97  The networks willingly denied the public 
this intensely salient information.  A CNN statement summed up the 
networks’ posture: “In deciding what to air, CNN will consider guidance 
Amendment theory and idea that First Amendment centrally protects media check on 
government); Neil W. Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media’s Continuing Fourth Estate 
Role, in NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL W. NETANEL EDS., THE COMMODIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION 317, 320-23 (2002) (describing necessary functions of mass media in 
sustaining liberal democracy) (hereinafter Netanel, Mass Media); Potter Stewart, “Or of the 
Press,” 26 HAST. L.J. 631 (1975) (advancing thesis that Press Clause of First Amendment 
charged press with special responsibility to check government abuses). 
94 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, OUR MEDIA NOT THEIRS: THE 
DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE AGAINST CORPORATE MEDIA 64-65 (2002) (“When a democracy 
considers whether to engage in war, the free flow of information is of dramatic significance: 
How can parents decide that the favor sending their sons and daughters off to fight when 
they lack adequate information about the causes, goals, and strategies of the proposed 
fight?”).
95 See Sumana Chatterjee, Networks Pledge Restraint on bin Laden Tapes, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 2001, p. A10.
96 See id.
97 Id.
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from appropriate authorities.”98
Major news organizations displayed similar fealty to authority in 
their credulous treatment of government positions before and during the 
Iraq war.  First, the press appears to have perpetuated its historic pattern 
of fostering public support for war.99  During late 2002 and early 2003, 
the Bush administration argued relentlessly that Iraq posed an immediate 
threat to the United States that warranted a preemptive invasion.   
Opinion polls from this period reveal a remarkable set of public
misperceptions about Iraq’s military capacity and alleged relationship to 
the September 11 attacks, beyond even the administration’s boldest 
assertions.  In a major national poll taken in January 2003, 44 percent of 
respondents expressed the view that all or most of the September 11 
hijackers were Iraqi citizens, and 41 percent believed Iraq possessed 
nuclear weapons.100  The next month, almost two thirds of respondents to 
another nationwide poll believed United Nations weapons inspectors had 
found proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction.101  In that 
survey 57 percent of respondents also believed Saddam Hussein had 
aided the September 11 hijackers, and in March two major polls found 
that about half the public believed Hussein was personally involved in the 
September 11 attacks.102  No serious evidence has ever arisen to support 
the Hussein-September 11 link, and the other beliefs recited above were 
and are demonstrably false.  This disconnect between public perception 
and reality at best reflects a profound failure by the media to inform the 
American people about issues of deep national import and at worst 
evinces reporting slanted in favor of going to war. 
Second, the news media’s coverage of the Iraq war often sacrificed 
independence and critical analysis for access to official decisionmakers 
and feel-good patriotism.  Frank reporting about the conduct of a war can 
inspire and substantiate antiwar dissent, as occurred dramatically when 
war correspondents in the late 1960s exposed the American public to the 
carnage in Vietnam.103  Despite the importance of unfettered reporting 
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
100 See Ari Berman, Polls Suggest Media Failure in Pre-War Coverage,
EDITORPUBLISHER.COM, March 26, 2003 (citing January 2003 Knight-Ridder/Princeton 
Research poll).
101 See id. (citing February 2003 Pew Research Center/Council on Foreign Relations 
survey).
102 See id.
103 See KNIGHTLEY, supra note 42, at 382-83 (contending that battlefield reporting from 
Vietnam “toppled a president, split the country, and caused many Americans to make a 
serious reappraisal of the basic nature of their nation”); Michael D. Steger, Slicing the 
Gordian Knot: A Proposal to Reform Military Regulation of Media Coverage of Combat 
Operations, 28 U.S.F.L. REV. 957, 966 (1994) (describing impact of nightly televised 
broadcasts of Vietnam war on public opinion).   A similar backlash occurred when news 
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from the battlefield, national media organizations during the 1991 Gulf 
War agreed to substantial constraints on reporting, including limits on the 
number of reporters granted access to the battlefield and even military 
screening of dispatches.104  When independent media challenged those 
constraints in court, the mainstream media stood silent, trading 
independence for access and competitive advantage within the 
government’s prescribed limits.105  Once the Iraq war began in March 
2003, the U.S. media gained international notoriety for its refusal to 
depict injured or dead Iraqi civilians, frightened American prisoners of 
war, and other images of the war’s human costs.106  CNN’s top war 
correspondent, Christiane Amanpour, decried her own network’s war 
coverage as “muzzled” due to “intimidat[ion] by the administration and 
by its foot soldiers at Fox News.”107
Several major media corporations, notably the New York Times and 
CNN, reported credulously about supposed discoveries of Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction that turned out to be false alarms.108  Some of the 
Times reports relied on questionable sources and received clearance from 
footage of soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu shifted public support against 
continued U.S. involvement in the Somali civil war.  See Capt. William A. Wilcox, Jr., Media 
Coverage of Military Operations: OPLAW Meets the First Amendment, 1995 ARMY LAW. 42, 
49 (1995) (arguing that extensive media coverage may have precipitated early withdrawal 
of troops from Mogadishu).
104 See William E. Lee, “Security Review” and the First Amendment, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 743, 746-47 (2002) (describing restrictions agreed to by media organizations 
covering Gulf War); Steger, supra note 103, at 972-73 (same).  Military screening of stories, 
beyond its directly restrictive effects, also chilled and impeded aggressive reporting.  See
Lee, supra, at 761-62 (describing effects of military security review on journalists during 
Gulf War).
105 See Lee, supra note 104, at 752-53 (analyzing large U.S. media outlets’ refusal to 
sue government over wartime constraints on newsgathering and reporting).  Legal 
challenges to government constraints on wartime reporting have a basis in First 
Amendment decisions granting the media rights of access to certain public proceedings.  See
Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 184-89 (explaining basis in precedent for claims of First 
Amendment rights of access to battlefields).
106 See, e.g., Cynthia Cotts, News of the Dirty War, VILLAGE VOICE, April 9, 2003, p. 34 
(cataloguing U.S. media’s failure to report widely on U.S.-led coalition’s bombings of Iraqi 
civilians, use of cluster bombs, and actions against foreign reporters).  Brit Hume of the 
unapologetically pro-war Fox News provided a telling apologia for this tendency: “You don’t 
have to be a genius to know that war is bloody and people die and injuries happen and these 
things are ugly.  It does not need to be splayed out in graphic detail.”  Did We See the Real 
War?  Or Just What the Pentagon Wanted Us to See?, ROLLING STONE, June 12, 2003, at 43, 
45.
107 Peter Johnson, Amanpour: CNN Practiced Self-Censorship, USATODAY.COM, Sep. 
14, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/life/columnist/mediamix/2003-09-14-
media-mix_x.htm (visited Sep. 16, 2003) (quoting Christiane Amanpour).  Responding to 
Amanpour’s comments, Fox News spokeswoman Irena Briganti declared: “Given the choice, 
it’s better to be viewed as a foot soldier for Bush than a spokeswoman for al-Quaeda.”  Id.
108 See Cynthia Cotts, What, No Smoking Gun?, VILLAGE VOICE, April 29, 2003, p. 33.  
President Bush eventually had to withdraw his claim that Iraq had possessed illicit 
weapons.  See David E. Sanger, Bush Backs Away From His Claims About Iraq Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, p. A1.
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military officials.109  Amanpour admitted that CNN’s reporting on Iraqi 
weapons reflected “disinformation at the highest levels.”110 In addition, 
American reporters uncritically accepted the Pentagon’s account of the 
rescue of a prisoner of war, Army private Jessica Lynch, which became 
one of the most prominent media events in the war.  Later reports by the 
BBC suggested the Army had exaggerated the episode deliberately to 
fabricate a heroic myth.111
The present antiterrorism campaign has generated numerous other 
instances of compromised news reporting.  In one notorious episode 
during the Iraq war, President Bush let slip in a press conference 
exchange with CNN correspondent Jon King that the White House had 
prescreened scripted questions.112  This embarrassing episode, which 
produced “a ripple of nervous laughter” among the assembled reporters, 
was conspicuous by its absence from the national media’s accounts of the 
press conference.113  After the September 11 attacks, the CNN Airport 
Network delayed or censored reports about aviation safety “that might 
cause anxiety or concern.”114  The network assiduously shielded air 
travelers from information many of them likely considered of the utmost 
relevance, going so far as to cut off in mid-broadcast one report about a 
deranged passenger’s antics aboard a Chicago-bound jetliner.115 Around 
the same time, conservative commentator John Podhoretz fumed that the 
media ignored a graphic Associated Press report in which he described a 
virulent anti-American celebration at a Palestinian university, which 
included desecration of an American flag.116  Months after the attacks, a 
New York Daily News reporter revealed that his editors, apparently at 
government urging, had refused to publish information he uncovered 
about the extent of the health risks posed by the twin towers’ 
109 See Russ Baker, ‘Scoops’ and Truth at the Times, NATION, June 23, 2003, p. 18.
110 Johnson, supra note 107 (quoting Amanpour).
111 See Edward Wasserman, Jessica Lynch’s story and the media jungle, PHILA 
INQUIRER, July 3, 2003, p. A19.
112 A verbatim account of this March 27, 2003 exchange appears in Matt Taibbi, 
Cleaning the Pool: The White House Press Corps Politely Grabs Its Ankles, N.Y. PRESS, April 
1, 2003, http://www.nypress.com/16/11/news&columns/cage.cfm (visited Oct. 
15, 2003).
113 Id.
114 Mark Maremont, CNN Airport Network Censors Reports That Could Be Disturbing 
to Passengers, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 10, 2001, p. B8 (quoting CNN spokeswoman 
Edna Johnson).
115 See id.
116 John Podhoretz, Now P.C. Means Censorship, N.Y. POST, Sep. 26, 2001, p. 39.  
Podhoretz argued that “because the United States and news organizations are coming down 
hard on bin laden, the Taliban and other extremist Muslims, editors in these organizations 
feel it would be overkill to make a big deal out of this dangerous display.”  Id.
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destruction.117 The Sinclair Broadcast Group, the nation’s largest 
owner of television stations, refused to air on its eight ABC affiliates 
a broadcast of ABC’s Nightline program dedicated to reading the 
names of Americans killed in the Iraq war, because Sinclair asserted 
that the program sought to convey an antiwar message.118   While 
some news outlets were acceding to government constraints and 
suppressing uncomfortable facts, others compromised their objective 
distance from government policy with conspicuous displays of patriotic 
fervor.119
News media misinformation and self-censorship has left the people of 
the United States with lesser grounds for assessing the merits of critical 
policy decisions about war and terrorism than a truly independent press 
would provide.  Although the government played a leading role in 
constraining reporting about the bin Laden tapes and about some aspects 
of the Iraq war, media corporations bear ultimate responsibility for the 
constraints.  Had news organizations held out for greater freedom to 
report information openly, they would have either prevailed or forced the 
government to fight legal battles to mandate limits on reporting.  Instead, 
by betraying their duty to gather and report information impartially and 
vigorously, the news organizations let the government have its cake and 
eat it too: the government got the silence it wanted without having to risk 
constitutional liability.
2.  Exclusions of Political Speakers from Privately Owned 
Public Spaces.
Private property is often essential for political debate because so 
much public interaction takes place in privately owned space, from 
shopping malls to the Internet.  No one advocates wholesale appropriation 
of private property for the sake of public discourse, but expressive 
activity is a natural and appropriate by-product of the general uses to 
which certain property owners – such as shopping mall owners, media 
corporations that depend on advertising revenues, and Internet service 
providers – choose for self-interested reasons to dedicate their property.  
During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property 
owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics 
of government policies from channels of expression opened by their own 
117 See JUAN GONZALEZ, FALLOUT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE 16-20 (2002)118 See Lisa de Moraes, Stations to Boycott “Nightline’s” List of the Fallen,
Wash. Post, April 30, 2004, p. C7.
119 See Ed Bark, Media’s Allegiance Debated, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2001, 
p. 25A (asking, shortly after terrorist attacks: “[W]hen 24-hour cable news networks 
incorporate the Stars and Stripes into on-air logos, are they in any way compromising their 
journalistic integrity?”); James Poniewozik, Whose Flag Is Bigger?, TIME, April 14, 2003, p. 
71 (criticizing, during Iraq war, “[media] decision makers who should be providing context 
and balance rather then festooning their screens with bunting”).
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invitations for the public to use their property.  
The most emblematic incidents involved expulsion of lone, peaceful 
protesters from spaces frequented by the public.  Stephen Downs’ arrest 
at the Crossgates Mall120 followed an incident a few months earlier in 
which the same mall had called the police to expel several local peace 
activists who had taped antiwar messages to their clothing and entered the 
mall.121  Around the same time, a New York City K-Mart store had 
shopper Amy Hamilton-Thibert arrested for trespassing.  Hamilton-
Thibert expressed herself somewhat more flamboyantly than Downs had: 
she wore an Easter bunny costume and handed out plastic eggs to protest 
K-Mart’s sale of military themed Easter baskets.122  Similar, farther-
reaching incidents involved intangible private space.  In the broadcast 
arena, television networks and channels including CNN and CBS refused 
to sell advertising time to various advocacy groups who sought to air their 
views on Middle East controversies, including the invasion of Iraq, and 
wartime economic policies.123  The broadcasters claimed that refusing 
“controversial” advertisements protected “the integrity of . . . news 
department[s], the public discourse and local sensibilities around the 
country,”124 but they offered no explanation of how stifling political 
debate was supposed to advance public discourse.  
In cyberspace, several Internet service providers (ISPs) suspended or 
dropped content providers for posting controversial information about 
terrorism or Iraq.  After the September 11 attacks, ISP Hypervine shut 
down an entire content network, Cosmic Entertainment, until Cosmic 
removed IRA Radio, Al Lewis Live, and Our Americas, programs that 
had all broadcast interviews with alleged terrorists.125  In addition, portal 
sites such as America Online and Yahoo reportedly “severely censored or 
pulled the plug entirely on certain message boards that had attracted anti-
120 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
121 See Barr, supra note 2, at 1, 18.
122 See Erik Baard, Bunny Busters, VILLAGEVOICE.COM (March 11, 2003), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0311/baard2.php (visited Oct. 15, 2003).
123 See A Super Bowl Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, p. A16 (describing refusal by 
CBS to sell MoveOn.org time during 2004 Super Bowl for advertisement critical of 
President); Nat Ives, MTV Refuses Antiwar Commercial, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2003, p. C4 
(describing refusal by MTV to sell time for advertisements opposing invasion of Iraq).
124 Ives, supra note 122, at C4 (paraphrasing statement of CBS executive vice president 
Martin Franks) (emphasis added).
125 See Janet Kornblum, “Radical” radio shows forced from the Net, USAToday.com, 
Oct. 16, 2001 (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001/10/16/ebrief.htm) 
(visited June 6, 2003).  Hypervine’s CEO, Travis Towle, claimed he acted in response to a 
call from someone identifying himself as a federal agent, who said the government could 
seize the company’s assets for presenting pro-terrorist materials.  The government refused 
comment.  See id.
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American and anti-Islam postings.”126  During the Iraq War, 
Massachusetts-based ISP Akamai Technologies cancelled its contract to 
host Arabic-language news service Al-Jazeera.127  Florida-based ISP 
Vortech temporarily removed a left-wing news site, YellowTimes.org, 
because the site had posted images of U.S. prisoners captured in the Iraq 
war.128   Vortech reportedly condemned the pictures as “disrespectful, 
tacky, and disgusting”129 and claimed that their display violated a terms-
of-service agreement signed by YellowTimes, although YellowTimes 
reported that Vortech had altered the terms-of-service agreement to fit the 
incident.130
Numerous entertainment corporations and institutions refused to 
display or publish art that questioned government policies in the wake of 
September 11.  Censorship of popular music was especially widespread.  
Just after the terrorist attacks, officials of the Clear Channel radio empire
circulated a “suggested” list of 150 songs to be barred from airplay.131
The list was both comically random – including, for example, the 
Bangles’ “Walk Like an Egyptian” and the Beatles’ “Ob-La-Di, Ob-La-
Da” – and ominously ideological: the lone musical group singled out for a 
total ban were Rage Against the Machine, the most aggressively left-wing 
rock band in recent memory.132  Major music retailers refused to carry an 
album by rapper Paris entitled Sonic Jihad, whose cover depicted a jet 
about to slam into the White House.133  Country singer Toby Keith even 
faced censorship for expression deemed overly patriotic when ABC 
dropped his performance of the revenge anthem “Courtesy of the Red, 
White and Blue” from its 2002 July 4th telecast.134
Elsewhere in the entertainment world, Hollywood studios delayed or 
cancelled numerous films scheduled for late 2001 releases – with one, 
126 Terrorism Rears Its Anti-U.S. Message on Net, MILW. JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Sep. 25, 
2001, p. M2 (reprinted from HOLLYWOOD REPORTER).
127 See Sandeep Junnarkar, Akamai ends Al-Jazeera server support, CNET News.com, 
April 4, 2003 (http://news.com.com/1200-1035-995546.html) (visited April 7, 
2003).
128 See Bernhard Warner, Censorship debate as POW pictures pulled (Reuters), March 
25, 2003 (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/030325/80/dw9a3.html) (visited June 6, 
2003).
129 Id. (quoting Vortech email to YellowTimes editor Erich Marquardt).
130 See Firas al-Atraqchi, War pictures cause Yellowtimes.org to be shut down, again,
YellowTimes.org, March 24, 2003 
(http://www.unknownnews.net/yellowtimes032403.html) (visited June 6, 2003).
131 See Clea Simon, Attacks Prompt List of “Banned” Songs, BOS. GLOBE, Sep. 20, 2001, 
p. D3.
132 See id. (reprinting Clear Channel list).
133 See Neil Strauss, Furor Over Rapper’s Cover Art Statement, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 
2003, p. E3.
134 See Singer Says ABC’s Jennings Gave Him the Boot, CNN.com, June 13, 2002 
(http://www.cnn.com/2002/SHWBIZ/Music/06/13/toby keith.abc/index.html) 
(visited Aug. 5, 2002).
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Phillip Noyce’s adaptation of Graham Greene’s novel The Quiet 
American, shelved by Mirimax for more than a year because it criticized 
expansionist U.S. foreign policy.135  The Baltimore Museum of Art 
removed a painting that prominently featured the word “terrorist” after 
patrons reportedly called the work “disturbing.”136  The Boston 
Symphony Orchestra cancelled a previously scheduled performance of 
excerpts from John Adams’ opera The Death of Klinghoffer, citing similar 
“sensitivity” concerns.137  HarperCollins nearly cancelled publication of 
Michael Moore’s Stupid White Men, which went on to become a 
bestseller, because the book criticized President Bush; the publisher 
relented only after an email campaign by librarians.138 Moore faced 
corporate censure again in 2004, when Walt Disney’s Miramax 
division refused to distribute his documentary film Farenheit 911, 
which criticized President Bush’s actions around the 2001 attacks.139
Cartoonists Aaron McGruder and Ted Rall saw newspapers drop their 
strips for criticizing, respectively, President Bush and families of the 
terror attacks’ victims.140  All of these artistic creations and performances, 
in their varied ways, encouraged listeners and viewers to confront 
perspectives or acknowledge emotions that many would have found 
offensive or unpleasant.141  Their censorship served to stifle the insights 
such confrontations often bring. 
3.  Reprisals Against Political Expression.
135 See Anne Thompson, Films With War Themes Are Victims of Bad Timing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, p. E1.  Another Mirimax film, Gregor Johnson’s Buffalo Soldiers,
screened at the Toronto Film Festival in September 2001 but had its U.S. theatrical release 
canceled because of its negative portrayal of U.S. soldiers.  See id.
136 Michael Scarcella, BMA Pulls Art Bearing Word “Terrorist,” BALT. SUN, Sep. 17, 
2001, p. 3B.
137 See Mark Swed, “Klinghoffer”: Too Hot to Handle?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, sec. 6 
at 1.
138 See Eric Demby, Angry White Men, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 21-27, 2002 (http://www. 
Villagevoice.com/issues/0234/demby.php) (visited June 6, 2003)139 See Jim Rutenberg & Laura M. Holson, Disney Takes Heat on Blocking 
Bush Film, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, p. ___.
140 See Stephen Lemons, Aaron McGruder, Creator of “The Boondocks,” Salon.com, Dec. 
7, 2001 
(http://archive.salon.com/people/feature/2001/12/07/mcgruder/print.html) 
(visited June 6, 2003) (discussing major newspapers’ refusal to run Boondocks strips critical 
of President Bush); Lisa O’Carroll, New York Times Cartoon Mocked September 11 Widows,
GUARDIAN, March 7, 2002, 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/attack/story/0,1301,663312,00.html (visited Oct. 
15, 2003) (discussing New York Times’ removal of Rall cartoon from Web site).
141 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 117 (contending that consideration of public 
issues, protected by First Amendment, includes consideration of “works of art of many 
kinds” and of a “vast array of idea of fact, of science and fiction, of poetry and prose”); 
Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 304 (noting political character of much art and 
literature).
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First Amendment law has always reflected a central concern with the 
chilling of speech – the danger that threats or reprisals against unpopular 
speakers will dissuade others from speaking their minds and challenging 
the status quo.  The anticommunist purges that followed the two World 
Wars are only the most prominent examples of how nongovernmental 
reprisals and intimidation can chill political expression.142  The present 
campaign against international terrorism has brought many new examples 
of this phenomenon.
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Columnists at the Grants 
Pass, Oregon Daily Courier and the Texas City, Texas Sun independently 
wrote columns that branded the President irresponsible and cowardly for 
failing to return to Washington immediately when the attacks began.143
Dan Guthrie, a ten-year veteran of the Daily Courier, entitled his column 
“When the going gets tough, the tender turn tail,” 144 while Tom Gutting 
of the Sun characterized the President as “‘flying around the country like 
a scared child.’”145    Each column apparently provoked strongly negative 
reader reactions, and the papers subsequently fired the columnists.  While 
neither paper admitted to a direct connection between column and firing, 
each sent strong indications that the column played a role, and neither 
appears to have cited any other ground for the firing.146  At least two 
California radio stations dropped left-wing commentators for criticizing 
government policies on terrorism, with one station owner explaining that 
“it is not in the public interest to broadcast what we consider to be 
divisive and destructive material at a time when it is critical to support 
our elected leaders.”147  Such reprisals in the wake of September 11 were 
not limited to liberal critics.  No less a conservative bastion than the 
National Review fired columnist Ann Coulter after she declared on the 
magazine’s Web site that the United States “should invade [Islamic] 
countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.”148
142 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
143 When the terrorists struck on the morning of September 11, President Bush 
initially flew from Florida to air force bases in Louisiana and Nebraska, returning to 
Washington about 7:00 p.m.  Dan Balz, Bush Confronts a Nightmare Scenario, WASH. POST, 
Sep. 12, 2001, p. A2.
144 Joel Davis, Two Casualties of Terror War?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 4.  
Guthrie wrote in his column that the President “skedaddled” and “hid out in a Nebraska 
hole.”  Simon Houpt, The War on Dissent, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 6, 2001, p. R1 
(quoting Guthrie column).
145 Davis, supra note 142, at 4.
146 See id. Sun Publisher Les Daughtry, Jr. personally wrote a page 1 apology for 
Gutting’s column, along with an op-ed piece entitled “Bush’s leadership has been superb.”  
Id.
147 Will Evans, Another Dissenting Voice Gone, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2001, 
http://www.sfbg.com/News/36/04/04ldw.html (visited Oct. 15, 2003) (quoting 
Michael Zwerling, owner of Santa Cruz station KSCO/KOMY-AM, on dropping talk show 
host Peter Werbe’s nationally syndicated program).
148 Houpt, supra note 142, at R1 (quoting Coulter column).
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A higher-profile media firing occurred during the Iraq War.  Peter 
Arnett, a top NBC news war correspondent, granted an interview to his 
counterparts at Iraq’s government-controlled television network in which 
he criticized the United States-led coalition’s conduct of the war.  Among 
other things, Arnett opined that the coalition’s initial strategy “failed 
because of Iraqi resistance”149 and that his reporting on Iraqi civilian 
casualties helped those who oppose the war.150  NBC initially defended 
Arnett’s remarks as analysis and “professional courtesy.”151  When the 
interview prompted a storm of condemnation, however, NBC quickly 
shifted gears and fired its star correspondent.  The network emphasized 
Arnett’s airing “his personal observations and opinions” to, in essence, an 
engine of enemy propaganda.152  It failed to acknowledge the irony that 
Arnett apparently felt the need to voice his sour assessment of the war to 
the state network of a totalitarian regime because his employer would not 
air such sentiments.  The war brought reprisals against reporters from 
more than just their own employers.  In March 2003, the Arabic-language 
television network Al Jazeera broadcast images of dead and imprisoned 
American soldiers in Iraq.  In response, both the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Nasdaq barred Al Jazeera’s financial correspondents 
from the exchanges’ trading floors.153  The N.Y.S.E. told Al Jazeera’s 
correspondent that an excess of reporters on the floor necessitated his 
expulsion, but an exchange official stated that Al Jazeera’s reporting from 
Iraq disqualified it from the ranks of “responsible news organizations.”154
Whether motivated by substantive distaste for dissent or more pragmatic 
fears about losing business, all of these reprisals silenced reporters who 
challenged prevailing opinion and, over a wider horizon, gave other 
reporters a strong incentive to stifle reports or commentary critical of the 
government.
Prominent entertainers as well have faced nongovernmental reprisals 
for questioning government policies on war and terrorism.  After the 
September 11 attacks, numerous television stations and advertisers 
temporarily boycotted the program “Politically Incorrect” after its host, 
Bill Maher, stated on the program that the government’s “lobbing cruise 
missiles from 2,000 miles away” was “cowardly” while “[s]taying in the 
149 Jim Rutenberg, NBC News Fires Arnett Over Iraqi TV Interview, N.Y. TIMES, March 
31, 2003 (late ed.), p. B2 (quoting Arnett interview).
150 See Poniewozik, supra note 118, at 71.
151 Rutenberg, supra note 147, at B2 (quoting initial NBC statement).
152 Id. (quoting NBC spokeswoman Allison Gollust).
153 See Junnarkar, supra note 126; Joyce Purnick, Censorship Is Patriotism to Big 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, p. D1.
154 Purnick, supra note 151, at D1 (quoting N.Y.S.E. executive vice president for 
communications Robert Zito).
28
airplane when it hits the building” was not.155  During the Iraq War, the 
National Baseball Hall of Fame cancelled a scheduled tribute to the 
movie Bull Durham because one of the invited participants, actor Tim 
Robbins, had criticized the government’s Iraq policy.156  Hall of Fame 
President Dale Petroskey, in a letter to Robbins, explained: “we believe 
your very public criticism of President Bush at this important – and 
sensitive – time in our nation’s history helps undermine the U.S. position, 
which ultimately could put our troops in even more danger.”157
Meanwhile, numerous radio stations – many owned by Clear Channel –
banned the Dixie Chicks’ music from the airwaves after the group’s lead 
singer, Natalie Maines, sharply criticized President Bush during a London 
concert.158  At least one station suspended disc jockeys for daring to play 
songs by the most popular group in country music.159  Retaliation against 
dissent in the entertainment world, like the direct suppression of 
politically expressive art discussed above,160 impedes democratic 
discourse by muffling ideas that help shape people’s political attitudes.
Nongovernmental suppression of speech has impeded political debate 
during the present campaign against international terrorism, just as it 
impeded debate during earlier periods of war and national emergency.  
True, public discourse itself ameliorates some speech-threatening 
nongovernmental actions: the Dixie Chicks became a civil libertarian 
cause celebre, and the news media have grown more critical of the 
administration’s Iraq policy as the occupation has dragged on.  But many 
important voices and ideas have disappeared without fanfare, and in any 
event, resilience in the face of censorship and misinformation does not 
obviate them as threats to democracy.  Allowing nongovernmental 
authorities to undermine political debate – especially at the moments 
when the stakes of policymaking are highest – increases the danger that 
our government will make unwise, democratically uninformed decisions.  
That danger compels the question why federal courts have failed to 
defend our democratic system by curbing nongovernmental censorship.  
The next part of this article examines the doctrinal reason for that failure 
155 Houpt, supra note 142, at R1 (quoting Maher).  These actions may have taken their 
impetus from criticism by the Bush administration.  See supra note 5 and accompanying 
text.
156 See Ira Berkow, The Hall of Fame Will Tolerate No Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 
2003, p. S4.
157 Id. (quoting Petroskey letter).  Petroskey subsequently acknowledged that he should 
have handled the situation differently, but he maintained the appropriateness of barring 
dissenting political statements from the Hall of Fame, and he made no effort to restore the 
invitation to Robbins.  See Ira Berkow, Hall of Fame President Acknowledges Mistake, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 12, 2003, p. S3.
158 See Alisa Solomon, The Big Chill, NATION, June 2, 2003, p. 17 (describing airplay 
ban on Clear Channel stations).
159 See Steve Carney & Geoff Boucher, Big Radio Chain Is Whistling Dixie Again, L.A. 
TIMES, May 7, 2003, sec. 5 at 2 (reporting suspension of Disc jockeys Dave Moore and Jeff 
Singer by country station KKCS in Colorado Springs, Colo.).
160 See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
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– the public-private distinction in constitutional law – and proposes a 
doctrinal shift that would allow courts to enjoin nongovernmental 
suppression of wartime political debate.
II. FROM PRIVATE SPHERE TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY
The First Amendment is presumptively irrelevant for the numerous 
recent cases, catalogued above, in which private actors during the current 
national crisis have suppressed political dissent.  Mainstream constitutional 
theory posits a strict distinction between private actors, who are shielded 
from constitutional liability and enjoy constitutional protections, and 
governmental actors, who are subject to constitutional constraints against 
interference with private actors’ rights.161  Most commentators agree that this 
rigid public-private distinction cannot form a coherent basis for 
constitutional adjudication.  Nonetheless, the distinction persists as a central 
element in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, leaving 
expressive freedom unprotected from private suppression.162  This part 
considers why, and to what extent, the public-private distinction should 
matter in constitutional law.  The first section summarizes the Court’s 
doctrinal embodiment of the public-private distinction – the state action 
doctrine – and the normative arguments offered in defense of the distinction.  
The second section sets forth the principal critiques of the public-private 
distinction.  The third section develops a methodology for incorporating the 
distinction into constitutional jurisprudence.  My conclusion is that courts, in 
adjudicating constitutional rights claims, should presumptively insulate from 
constitutional claims only the personal actions of individuals and should 
presumptively extend constitutional rights only to individuals.   This 
approach would honor both our substantive understandings of constitutional 
rights and our strongest instincts about the value of personal integrity.  The 
161 My focus in the discussion that follows on the public-private distinction’s function of 
shielding private actors from constitutional liability should not obscure its equally 
important function of constraining government action.  Under the public rights theory of 
expressive freedom, judicious governmental regulation can play a critical role in advancing 
First Amendment values.  See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1976-78.  Rigid categorical 
restrictions on “public” action can indiscriminately restrict regulation.  See Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State Action 
Doctrine, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 129, 159-60 (noting potential of flexible state action doctrine 
for establishing constitutionality of affirmative action programs); David A. Strauss, State 
Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMM. 409 (1993) (advocating permissive 
functional analysis of government regulations under state action doctrine) (hereinafter 
Strauss, State Action); see also Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 268 (suggesting that 
collapsing public-private distinction would require courts mechanistically to enjoin all 
institutional behavior in which government may not engage under present law).
162 See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (rejecting on state action grounds claim that Internet service provider’s restriction on 
unsolicited email violated First Amendment).
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final part of this article will work through this methodology in the First 
Amendment context to address nongovernmental suppression of wartime 
dissent.
A. The Public-Private Distinction in Action
1.  The State Action Doctrine
The key provisions of the Constitution that deal with individual rights 
identify the government as the object of their prohibitions.  The First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”163  The Fourteenth Amendment, the 
most significant guarantor of rights against the states, specifies that “no 
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”164  These textual elements have led the Supreme 
Court to conclude that no constitutional cause of action lies against a 
nongovernmental defendant.  In the classic articulation of this rule, The 
Civil Rights Cases,165 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
authorized Congress to regulate only state conduct, not private conduct.  
The public-private distinction reached its legal apex in the early 20th
Century, when the Supreme Court in such cases as Lochner v. New 
York166 and Coppage v. Kansas167 designated contract and property 
relationships as fundamental private freedoms, shielded by the Due 
Process Clause from states’ regulatory authority.  After the Court 
abandoned the economic substantive due process doctrine,168 the 
constitutional role of the public-private distinction shifted to the question 
when nominally private entities “may be appropriately characterized as 
‘state actors’” by federal courts.169
Under the modern state action doctrine, the Court inquires “whether 
the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a 
right or privilege having its source in state authority.”170  Occasionally the 
163 U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
164 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, sec.  1.
165 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
166 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down, as violation of due process right to contract, New 
York statute that set maximum hours for bakery employees).
167 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down, as violation of due process right to contract, 
Kansas statute that banned employers from prohibiting union membership).
168 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding New York regulation 
that set maximum retail price for milk against due process challenge and disavowing 
aggressive constitutional review of property and contract regulations).
169 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
170 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
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Court has approached this analysis by inquiring whether a 
nongovernmental defendant performs the sorts of functions traditionally 
associated with government.171  More commonly, the Court has inquired 
whether the nongovernmental defendant has a sufficiently close nexus 
with the government – through a relationship such as contract, 
authorization, or regulation – that the Court can attribute its conduct to 
the government.172  Under the state action doctrine, courts may enjoin 
only the state.  If a court finds nongovernmental conduct entwined with 
the state, it either deems the nongovernmental conduct state action173 or 
directs a remedy against the government entity that has facilitated the 
nongovernmental conduct.174  The Court has resolved the state action 
issue on a case-by-case basis: “Only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance.”175
The state action doctrine has led the Court to a bewildering series of 
unpredictable results that, at a minimum, bear out its characterization of 
the doctrine as heavily fact-dependent.  A restaurant that leases space in a 
government building engages in state action when it commits racial 
discrimination,176 but a club that secures a government license to sell 
liquor may discriminate with impunity.177  Judicial enforcement of a 
racially restrictive real estate covenant is state action,178 but judicial 
enforcement of a racially discriminatory condition in a will is not.179  A 
landlord’s racial discrimination in renting, authorized by the state 
Constitution’s repeal of local antidiscrimination laws, is state action,180
but a warehouseman’s sale of bailed goods to satisfy a lien, authorized by 
the state’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, is not.181  A 
creditor that uses state courts to attach a debtor’s property in an ex parte 
171 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (enjoining limitation on expressive 
freedom by “company town”).  This “public function” approach may boil down to an implicit 
balancing of rights claimants’ interests against property holders’ interests.  See KATHLEEN 
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (14th ed. 2001) (suggesting 
balancing interpretation of Marsh).
172 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (enjoining 
racial discrimination by restaurant located in state-owned building).
173 See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25 (holding that, when nonstate actor and state 
are interdependent, nonstate actor’s conduct may be attributed to state).
174 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (barring state court from 
enforcing racially restrictive real estate covenant).
175 Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
176 See Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
177 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
178 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
179 See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
180 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
181 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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proceeding is a state actor,182 but a utility that uses its state-conferred 
monopolistic power to cut off a customer’s electric service without notice 
or a hearing is not.183  A statewide interscholastic athletic association that 
includes both public and private schools is a state actor,184 but a 
nationwide interscholastic athletic association that includes both public 
and private schools is not.185  Everyone agrees that public schools by 
definition are state actors, and yet a nominally private school that 
receives nearly all its funding from the state and must adhere to extensive 
state regulations is not.186
In the First Amendment context, the Court over the past six decades 
has moved from an expansive view of state action to an increasing 
reluctance to impose constitutional obligations on nongovernmental 
actors.  In Marsh v. Alabama,187 the Court enjoined a company from 
proscribing expressive activity in a “company town.”  The majority found 
the company town functionally indistinguishable from a traditional town 
and accordingly held it to the same First Amendment standards enforced 
against governments.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,188 the Court 
enjoined a defamation action that threatened to chill the expression of 
civil rights advocates.  Although the action involved only private parties, 
the Court held that judicial enforcement of a judgment for the plaintiff 
would have amounted to redressable state action.  More recent cases, 
however, have retreated from the implications of Marsh and Sullivan.  In 
a sequence of cases from the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court 
ultimately refused to extend First Amendment obligations to privately 
owned shopping malls.189  During the same period, the Court rejected 
contentions that newspapers and television networks had sufficient public 
ties to make them properly subject to state regulation.190
2.  Normative Defenses
182 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
183 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
184 See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 
(2001).
185 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
186 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
187 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
188 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
189 See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that shopping center could not bar union organizers from 
picketing); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (rejecting antiwar protestors’ First 
Amendment challenge to exclusion from shopping mall); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976) (overruling Logan Valley).  For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 344-
52 and accompanying text.
190 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down state 
statute that required newspapers to grant right of reply to political candidates criticized in 
print); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973) (rejecting 
argument that broadcast licensee was state actor) (plurality opinion).  For further 
discussion of CBS v. DNC, see infra notes 353-60 and accompanying text.
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Beyond its textual bases, the public-private distinction implicates 
normative concerns.  Some of those concerns are structural, positing that 
the federal government or the judicial branch is the wrong entity to place 
constraints on private behavior.  More significant is the argument that a 
sphere of private behavior, shielded from constitutional norms, is a 
necessary element of constitutional liberty.  That argument, which posits 
private autonomy as an irreducible minimum of rights, demands the 
attention of critics, discussed in the next section, who fault the public-
private distinction for insulating violations of rights.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court justified the state action doctrine 
on grounds of federalism, striking down a federal ban on racial 
discrimination in public accommodations because the ban encroached on 
states’ exclusive prerogative to regulate various sorts of private 
behavior.191  The Court’s willingness since that decision to expand the 
boundaries of state action has tended to vary inversely with its fervor for 
state prerogatives.192  Commentators occasionally reprise the argument 
that courts should enforce the public private distinction in order to 
preserve states’ regulatory authority.193  Several flaws undermine this 
position.  First, the premise that the Constitution requires broad 
preservation of state prerogatives lacks force.194  Second, even if the 
191 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1882).  The Court’s decision, however, 
presumed not only that states had authority to protect personal freedom but that they 
actually did protect freedom.  See id. at 17 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment “does not 
invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State 
legislation”).  Thus, the decision does not stand for the proposition that federal courts must 
give states carte blanche to permit violations of rights.
192 For a historical analysis of this relationship, see Ronna Greff Schneider, State 
Action – Making Sense Out of Chaos – an Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737 
(1985).
193 See William M. Burke & David J. Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and 
Creditor’s’ Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1015 
(1973) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment is designed to constrain states “without 
unduly interfering with the state’s primary responsibility to develop the basic positive law 
that governs individuals”); Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The “Government 
Function” and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 762 (arguing that state 
action doctrine safeguards “the fourteenth amendment’s restriction on the authority of the 
national government vis-à-vis the states regarding the regulation of the myriad 
relationships that occur between one individual and another”); Kevin Cole, Federal and 
State “State Action”: The Uncritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 
327, 358-62 (1990) (articulating federalism justification for state action limitation on federal 
courts); Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 781 
(1989) (arguing that state action doctrine “serves the cause of federalism by limiting control 
by Congress . . . and the federal courts over matters otherwise left to the states”); cf.
William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 21 (1961) 
(“The local prerogative to determine which interests are worthy of legal protection should be 
recognized through application of the state action requirement, but only when the local 
determination is made for purposes which are constitutionally legitimate.”).
194 See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination,
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premise had force, serious doubt would remain whether federal judges 
should act to preserve state prerogatives.195  Finally, even if judicial 
preservation of state prerogatives were appropriate, deeming various 
defendants immune from federal constitutional or statutory authority 
would be an imprecise, indirect means to that end.196  The Court could 
simply articulate federalism-based limits on substantive federal authority, 
as in recent years it has proved more than willing to do.197
Other commentators have defended the public-private distinction in 
constitutional law based on the separation of powers, arguing that courts 
should not or cannot make the value judgments required to adjudicate 
rights controversies.198  Michael Seidman makes a persuasive historical 
case that New Deal liberals developed the contemporary state action 
doctrine as a check on judicial interference with the emerging regulatory 
state.199  He also explains, however, that the state action doctrine is an 
incoherent device for constraining judges, because the very legal 
revolution liberals sought to protect from judicial intervention 
destabilized the distinction between the public and private spheres.200
46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1224-36 (2001) (criticizing arguments for broad-based protection of 
state prerogatives in federal system).  The notion that robust state power protects liberty is 
especially dubious, given states’ historically poor record in conflicts over rights.  See id. at 
1229-33.
195 Several commentators have argued persuasively that various features of our 
political system serve to protect state prerogatives from federal interference. See Jesse H. 
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial 
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1485 (1994); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 552 (1954).
196 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 N.W.U. L. REV. 503, 542-
47 (1985) (hereinafter Chemerinsky, Rethinking).
197 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (announcing limit on 
congressional authority to enforce Fourteenth Amendment against states).
198 See Burke & Reber, supra note 191, at 1017 (extolling state action doctrine as a 
means to judicial restraint); Frank I. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal 
Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (1982) (defending 
state action doctrine based on “skepticism as to judges’ capacity to identify . . . rights in an 
objective and principled fashion [and] conviction that the choice among competing social 
and moral values and interests should be made through the political rather than the 
judicial process”); Graglia, supra note 191, at 781 (arguing that state action doctrine “serves 
the cause of separation of powers by limiting opportunities for judicial policymaking”); 
Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMM. 329, 340 (1993) (expressing concern 
about shift of legal authority from “ordinary law” to Constitution, which state action 
doctrine prevents); William Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking 
“Rethinking State Action,” 80 N.W.U.L. REV. 558, 563-67 (1985) (defending state action 
doctrine on ground that it prevents judges from having to balance competing constitutional 
interests); Strauss, State Action, supra note 159, at 416-17 (arguing that legislatures are 
better equipped than courts to address various contemporary constitutional issues).
199 See Louis M. Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMM. 379, 398 (1993).
200 See id. at 399.  For a discussion of problems with distinguishing the public and 
private spheres, see infra section II.B.1. (describing ontological critique of public-private 
distinction).
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Moreover, to the extent the separation-of-powers defense rests on a 
pessimistic assessment of judges’ ability to balance the interests at stake 
in rights disputes, it proves too much.  Judges routinely balance important 
interests, and they must do so under any conception of constitutional 
adjudication.201  Moreover, the argument that courts lack either the 
authority or the capacity to balance rights, like the federalism argument, 
ultimately depends on the dubious view that courts should constrain their 
authority indirectly rather than through forthright constitutional or 
prudential doctrines.202
A more forceful defense extols the public-private distinction as a 
necessary precondition for liberty.  The notion of a public-private distinction 
relates closely to natural rights theories that hold certain spheres of human 
activity inviolable.203  Robert Mnookin explains that “[t]he distinction 
between public and private connects with a central tenet of liberal thought: 
the insistence that because individuals have rights, there are limits on the 
power of government vis-à-vis the individual.”204  Maimon Schwarzschild 
praises the public-private distinction for leaving “private persons and 
institutions . . . presumptively free to act in accordance with manifold and 
differing values, lest some authentic values be submerged altogether.”205
Libertarian arguments for the public-private distinction depend on the 
premise that government has a unique capacity to coerce behavior and 
impede personal freedom.  In Charles Fried’s formulation: “The state is the 
law, and the law is final – even when the law appears in the humble guise of 
201 See, e.g., Charles Black, Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 103 (1967) (positing that judges are amply equipped to 
perform the sorts of analyses required in constitutional cases).
202 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 547 (criticizing state action 
doctrine as a means of dividing authority among branches of government).  For an 
argument that faults the public-private distinction precisely because it prevents further 
examination of social problems through constitutional discourse, see Paul S. Berman, 
Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional 
Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1289-1305 (2000).
203 See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1300 
(1982) (noting “mutually sympathetic” character of state action doctrine and natural rights 
theory); Morton J. Hor[]witz, The History of the Public / Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1423 (1982) (tracing concept of private sphere to development of natural rights 
theories in 16th and 17th centuries) (hereinafter Hor[]witz, Public-Private); Gary Peller, The 
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1209 (1985) (linking public-private 
distinction with notion in social contract theory that individuals sacrifice autonomy only on 
understanding that government will remain neutral as to private relations); but see 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 527-32 (arguing that state action doctrine is 
incompatible with natural rights theory, which holds that rights predate the state); 
Goodman, supra note 196, at 1332-34 (advancing process-based argument that natural 
rights theory requires an activist judiciary while state action doctrine enforces judicial 
restraint).
204 Robert H. Mnookin, The Public-Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and 
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982).
205 Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 137.
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a municipal ordinance.”206 Indeed, some defenders of the public-private 
distinction in constitutional law insist the present state action doctrine 
constrains too narrow a range of government authority to sustain a 
meaningful zone of private autonomy.207
Defenses of a rigid public-private distinction in the particular context of 
the First Amendment rely primarily on libertarian arguments.  In the most 
pointed argument for limiting expressive freedom guarantees to 
governmental actors, Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat emphasize the implicit 
First Amendment interests of property owners who resist First Amendment 
constraints,208 and they extol property owners’ roles as “private speech 
regulators” who decide independently which free speech norms to follow.209
Eule and Varat argue that extending First Amendment norms to 
nongovernmental actors would amount to government-imposed “orthodoxy 
of the First Amendment itself,”210 preventing “the development of alternative 
perspectives and values that might contribute to adjustment of currently 
prevailing First Amendment standards.”211  This naked preference for 
economic markets to determine the nature and extent of expressive freedom 
is a more straightforward account of the “necessary indeterminacy of public 
discourse” posited by Robert Post.212  Post deems the public-private 
distinction practically necessary, even if descriptively unclear, because 
eliding the distinction would eviscerate the autonomy essential to 
maintaining public discourse.213  Fried echoes the point that courts must 
preserve nongovernmental prerogatives to censor in order to foster 
206 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 236 (1992); see also Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 138 n.41 (stressing 
that “even the most powerful corporation cannot directly control the armed might of the 
state”).
207 See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to 
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1537, 1549 
(1998) (arguing that Court’s focus on defining public sphere prevents state action doctrine 
from creating “coherent zone of private autonomy”); Kay, supra note 196, at 351 (arguing 
that state action doctrine fails to maintain a zone of individual autonomy because it does 
not limit the reach of federal statutes or state law); see also Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. 
Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383, 397 (1988) (noting that most 
behavior state action doctrine restricts courts from enjoining is behavior legislatures have 
power to restrict).
208 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1554-61 (discussing, among other cases, Marsh 
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)).  For a 
discussion of state action precedents in the First Amendment area, see supra notes 185-88 
and accompanying text.
209 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1605.  Eule and Varat’s case for private 
entities’ prerogatives to set independent free speech norms focuses intently on educational 
institutions.  See, e.g., id. at 1606.  How strongly they would maintain their argument in the 
context of noneducational entities, such as business corporations, is unclear.
210 Id. at 1617.
211 Id. at 1618.
212 Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1993).
213 This is a necessarily slim summation of the complex discussion in id. at 1125-28.
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independent conceptions of expressive freedom,214 and he brushes off the 
dangers of private censorship with the assurance that private law will prevent 
excesses.215
Defenses of the public-private distinction in the First Amendment 
context tend to posit individual autonomy as the chief value underlying 
expressive freedom,216 and they maintain that government generally should 
allow the economic market to distribute expressive opportunities and to 
dictate the availability of information.217  These are hallmarks of the private 
rights theory of expressive freedom, which treats the First Amendment as a 
negative protection of expressive autonomy against governmental 
interference.218  The public-private distinction is integral to the private rights 
theory in several ways.  The distinction underwrites the private rights 
theory’s individuated notion of expressive freedom as analogous to a 
214 See Fried, supra note 204, at 237 (arguing that private restrictions on speech “issue 
from the limiting person’s own exercise of liberty” and also “derive from other rights that 
the limiter might have”).
215 See id. at 234-35.
216 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1621 (emphasizing “self-development, self-
definition, and self-determination values” as “among the most powerful reasons for 
according the protection of speech such a high priority in the public realm”); Fried, supra
note 204, at 233 (asserting that “[f]reedom of expression is properly based on autonomy”); 
Post, supra note 210, at 1118-19 (stating that “[t]he enterprise of public discourse . . . rests 
on the value of autonomy”); see also John H. Garvey, Private Power and the Constitution, 10 
CONST. COMM. 311, 316 (1993) (“If everything we do and think is state action, the freedom 
of speech rests on an illusion); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship 
Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 274-77 (1996) (arguing that individual autonomy 
maintained by public-private distinction is essential to democracy).  Even Vincent Blasi, 
who enlists the public-private distinction in his argument that the First Amendment allows 
the press to check government misconduct for the overall good of society, contrasts the 
individualist tilt of his theory with Meiklejohn’s collectivist commitments.  See Blasi, supra
note 93, at 538-41 (defending public-private distinction); id. at 562 (criticizing Meiklejohn 
for “hostil[ity] to many of the most prominent manifestations of individualism”).
217 See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1600 (“Frequently, when the government 
giveth, it simultaneously taketh away.”); Fried, supra note 204, at 251 (maintaining that 
the only neutral device for distributing expressive resources is “a society in which a 
significant portion of the resources are [sic] in private hands and beyond the reach of 
government altogether”); Post, supra note 210, at 1118 (arguing that “[t]he state ought not 
to be empowered to control the agenda of public discourse”); see also Gey, supra note 214, at 
277-80 (warning against inevitable government excess in speech regulation); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 979-82 (1995) (resisting 
conflation of economic and expressive marketplaces aimed at justifying regulation).  Fried 
wins the prize for dogmatism on this point by tying advocates of government involvement in 
the distribution of expressive opportunities to “apologists for Marxism-Leninism.”  Fried, 
supra note 204, at 252.  In contrast, other defenders of the public-private distinction 
gingerly acknowledge the propriety of government intervention to advance expressive 
freedom in narrow areas.  See Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1600 (approving some 
government regulation of campaign finance and broadcast licensing); Post, supra note 210, 
at 1132-33 (suggesting that some government regulation of campaign finance might be 
appropriate).
218 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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property right rather than a social good directed at effective government.219
The distinction’s formalism parallels the theory’s denial of any affirmative 
entitlement to expressive opportunity and its special solicitude for the free 
speech claims of powerful institutions.220  Most directly, the distinction’s 
barrier against government interference with private behavior enables the 
theory’s rejection of government regulation to advance expressive 
freedom.221
The libertarian arguments in favor of the public-private distinction 
provide the most forceful normative claims for the distinction.  Personal 
freedom is the very interest that animates criticism of the state action 
doctrine, because of the doctrine’s frequent effect of invalidating legal claims 
of constitutional rights.222  Defeating the libertarian defense requires a 
critique that demonstrates the public-private distinction’s negative effect on 
rights.  Accordingly, the next section turns to the distinction’s critics. 
 B.Three Stages of Criticizing the Public-Private 
Distinction
Critiques of the public-private distinction as a feature of our legal 
system have operated in three principal modes.  The largest set of 
critiques, proceeding from insights of legal realism, has exposed the 
distinction as ontologically incoherent.  Another type of critique, typified 
by observations of the Critical Legal Studies movement, has 
characterized the distinction as ideologically biased, advancing the 
political and economic agendas of the socially powerful.  Recent critics 
have sought to accommodate the insights of the realist and critical 
perspectives to the reality that the public-private distinction continues to 
exert a powerful hold over the popular and legal imagination.  These new 
critics have sought to reshape the ideological contours of the public-
private distinction to satisfy a variety of normative concerns.  I analogize 
the three stages of dealing with the public-private distinction to three 
stages through which psychologists posit people as moving when coping 
with grief: denial, anger, and acceptance.223
219 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1953-54 (discussing private rights theory’s 
individuated model of expressive freedom).
220 See id. at 1954-56 (discussing private rights theory’s formal conception of rights).
221 See id. at 1957-58 (discussing private rights theory’s distrust of government 
regulation).
222 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 507-11.
223 See generally ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969).  Just as the 
literal stages of grief are not always as distinct or as universal as some have assumed, the 
following discussion will show that the critiques of the public-private distinction analogous 
to those stages are not mutually exclusive and that some of them intermingle in particular 
arguments.  The discussion that follows does not pretend to set forth every significant 
analysis of the public-private distinction, but it describes and assesses representative 
accounts of the major critiques.
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1. Denial: The Ontological Critique
Several generations of legal scholars have established that the rigid 
public-private distinction, manifested in the Court’s state action doctrine, 
cannot do its supposed job: maintaining a principled distinction between 
actors that should be subject to constitutional constraint and those that 
should not.  The Court has fanned this ontological critique with its 
numerous seemingly irreconcilable holdings about the character of 
nongovernmental action.224  Rather than even attempting to reconcile 
these uncomfortably disparate holdings, the Court insists it is engaged in 
a principled, albeit necessarily fact-sensitive, analysis.225   Ontological 
critics point to the Court’s contortions as demonstrating how the terms 
“public” and “private” in constitutional law necessarily converge until no 
meaningful distinction is possible.226  They charge that the Court’s 
unprincipled distinctions expose “state action” as “nothing more than a 
catch-phrase.”227
Under the familiar positivist understanding of rights, which holds that 
all legal prerogatives and duties result from state policy decisions, the 
notion that any right can exist free from governmental involvement is 
incoherent.228  We may be able to distinguish nongovernmental actors’ 
conduct from the government’s conduct at a simple descriptive level, but 
in assessing constitutional claims, we can never extricate 
nongovernmental actors’ behavior from government prohibition or 
facilitation.229  “It has long been clear that the state can violate the 
224 See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
226 See Duncan Kennedy, The States of Decline of the Public / Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354-57 (1982) (describing convergence of public and private 
categories).
227 Black, supra note 199, at 88.
228 See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 103 (1987) (“The notion 
that there is a meaningful private domain, dominated by consensual contract, obviously 
depends on ignoring the extent to which the state inevitably regulates the steps one can 
take to induce others to contract.”); Brest, supra note 201, at 1301 (explaining tension 
between legal positivism and notion that rights can be violated absent state involvement); 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 520-27 (same); Harold W. Horowitz, The 
Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 SO. CAL. L. REV. 
208, 209 (1957) (contending that “whenever, and however, a state gives legal consequences 
to transactions between private persons there is ‘state action’”); Cass R. Sunstein, State 
Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 465, 466-67 (2002) (explaining dependence of 
“negative rights,” notably freedoms of property and contract, on government action) 
(hereinafter Sunstein, State Action); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex. 
L. Rev. 347, 367 (1963) (“it is difficult to conceive of situations where state action is not 
present”); see also Peller, supra note 201, at 1226-40 (describing early critiques of public-
private distinction in deconstructive strand of legal realism); but see Burke & Reber, supra
note 191, at 1035-39 (criticizing conflation of state actions and omissions).
229 Failure to appreciate this difference accounts for Frank Goodman’s assertion that 
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[Fourteenth Amendment] by ‘inaction’ as well as by ‘action.’”230  A 
classic example is the California constitutional provision struck down in 
Reitman v. Mulkey,231 which repealed all local ordinances that banned 
discrimination in housing and prohibited enactment of such ordinances in 
the future.  Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reitman, argued that the 
provision had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it did no 
more “than would have California’s failure to pass any such 
antidiscrimination statutes in the first instance.”232  In his seminal 
extended metaphor, Charles Black responded that the provision had not 
“‘merely’ failed to throw the life-preserver” but rather had “put the life-
preserver out of convenient reach, so as not to be tempted to throw it, and 
. . . passed the word down the line to those [the state] commands, that the 
life-preserver is not to be thrown.”233
The Fourteenth Amendment’s textual limitation to “state action”234
settles nothing, because assessment of the government’s liability must 
encompass all of the active and passive ways in which government can 
“deprive” a citizen of a right or “deny” equal protection.235  Indeed, Erwin 
Chemerinsky has argued persuasively that the Framers textually limited 
the federal Constitution’s reach to governmental action only on the 
the case of nongovernmental actors’ expressly unlawful conduct provides an undeniable 
instance of purely private conduct, thus demonstrating the viability of the state action 
doctrine.  See Goodman, supra note 196, at 1343-44.  When government prohibits private 
behavior and enforces that prohibition, it acts in a manner that should obviate any need for 
a constitutional claim against the behavior.  When government fails to prohibit private 
behavior, or fails to enforce a legal prohibition, it acts in a manner likely to inspire a 
constitutional claim.
230 Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
473, 481 (1962). Mark Tushnet posits that the intuitive distinction between action and 
inaction may have much to do with the persistence of the state action doctrine, and he 
suggests the relationship may be somewhat circular, with the intuition owing much to the 
presence of the state action doctrine.  See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403-04.
231 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
232 Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
233 Black, supra note 199, at 83 (footnote omitted).
234 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
235 See Black, supra note 199, at 84 (“[T]he question is not whether state action is 
present, but what the thrust and effect of the state action is.”); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & 
John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Action” 
Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 229 (contending that the relevant issue is not 
“whether a state has ‘acted,’ but whether a state has ‘deprived’ someone of a guaranteed 
right”); Henkin, supra note 228, at 481 (contending that relevant issue “is not whether the 
state has ‘acted,’ but . . . whether because of the character of state involvement, or the 
relation of the state to the private acts in issue, there has been a denial for which the state 
should be held responsible”); Horowitz, supra note 226, at 211 (“The critical issue here is 
not the presence or absence of state action; it is the far more difficult question of giving 
meaning to the phrase ‘deny the equal protection of the laws.’”); Sunstein, State Action, 
supra note 226, at 467-68 (calling for refocusing of analysis from state action question to 
meaning of substantive constitutional guarantees).  The First Amendment’s narrower 
description of the prohibited action – “Congress shall make no law” – might appear less 
likely to harbor the negative predicate, but the Court has long since expanded those words 
to encompass governmental action other than lawmaking, creating a meaning as 
encompassing as that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.
NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME 
DEBATE
41
understanding that individuals possessed natural rights, which states were 
bound to protect – an understanding that rendered constitutional 
safeguards against nongovernmental violations of rights superfluous.236
On this understanding, the Constitutional text states no affirmative bar on 
holding nongovernmental actors to rights guarantees; at most it suggests 
such a bar by negative implication.  The reality of nongovernmental 
institutions’ power to deny expressive freedom precludes allowing such 
an implication to rule constitutional doctrine. Thus, the Court’s decisions 
in Shelley v. Kramer237 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan238 reflect a 
necessary understanding that judicial enforcement of “private” legal 
interests amounts to state action.  
Complementing the positivist insight that every circumstance 
involves state action is the reality that nongovernmental entities often 
rival or exceed the government’s power to deny the values reflected in the 
Constitution’s guarantees of rights.239  Particularly in the employment 
setting, nongovernmental authorities often exert far greater control over 
individual behavior than government does.240  The Supreme Court on 
occasion has acknowledged the coercive capacity of nongovernmental 
actors to deny rights, as in the ultimate holding of the White Primary 
Cases241 that a political party acted unconstitutionally when it excluded 
236 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 511-16.  Critics of the state action 
doctrine have cited this theory in defending the outcome in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1882), maintaining that the Court there thought no constitutional remedy necessary 
because the state would vindicate its citizens’ rights.  See id. at 516; Horowitz, supra note 
226, at 211.
237 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding judicial enforcement of racially restrictive real estate 
covenant to be state action that violated equal protection rights).
238 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding state court’s enforcement of libel law to be state action 
that violated First Amendment rights).
239 See KELMAN, supra note 226, at 109 (positing that “one can readily see people’s 
relationship to local government authority as at least as voluntary as one’s relationship to 
private corporate authority”); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 510-11 (noting 
that “the concentration of wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large 
corporations, makes the effect of private actions in certain cases virtually indistinguishable 
from the impact of governmental conduct”) (footnote omitted); Robert L. Hale, Rights Under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals,
6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 628 (1946) (“Employers or unions may as effectively as the state 
itself bar Negroes from certain occupations.”); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 392 (refuting 
argument that government stands in unique position to infringe personal freedoms); see 
also Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1428 (tying attacks on public-private 
distinction in late 19th and early 20th centuries to rise of powerful corporate entities).  For a 
thorough discussion of corporate power’s implications for community life, see CHARLES E. 
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
240 See CHARLES REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 30 (1995) (“Employers can and do
demand a degree of subservience and conformity that public government could never 
require.  Economic punishment is a more effective weapon than the punishment inflicted by 
law.”).
241 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also Morse 
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African-American voters from the party’s primary elections.242  More 
recently, the Court has acknowledged that private cable operators’ power 
as “gatekeepers” of public access to information justifies greater lenience 
in reviewing regulations of their programming decisions.243  The Court’s 
failure to analyze the intent of governmental actors who facilitate certain 
nominally private denials of rights also suggests that nongovernmental 
actors can exert constitutionally cognizable coercive authority.244
Acknowledging nongovernmental institutions’ independent power 
unmasks as a formalism the argument that government’s unique power to 
deny rights justifies the public-private distinction.245
The ontological critique provides a powerful response to the 
libertarian argument that undergirds the public-private distinction.  If 
state power underwrites all behavior, then the liberty the state action 
doctrine protects stands on the same footing as the liberty the doctrine 
makes vulnerable to nongovernmental encroachments.  We can no longer 
distinguish easily between rights holders and rights violators; rather, 
adjudication of constitutional rights disputes necessarily requires 
balancing the putative plaintiff’s liberty interest against the putative 
defendant’s liberty interest.246  As Erwin Chemerinsky recognizes, “the 
state action doctrine is an absurd basis for choosing between the two 
liberties,”247 because the doctrine ignores the substance of the interests at 
stake in favor of an ultimately meaningless inquiry into the defendant’s 
relationship to the state.
v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (plurality opinion) (treating political 
party as state actor under Voting Rights Act).
242 For a discussion of the problems political parties pose for the public-private 
distinction, see Magarian, supra note 9, at 2043-50.
243 See Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994) (Turner I) (“The 
First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not 
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, 
through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information 
and ideas.”).
244 Jesse Choper notes the tension between cases in which the Court has found equal 
protection violations based on the actions of nongovernmental parties – such as Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) –
and subsequent decisions, notably Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that condition 
equal protection violations on discriminatory intent.  See Choper, supra note 191, at 769-72.  
Because the ultimate government actors in the state action decisions presumably lacked 
discriminatory intent, we can resolve the tension only by reading the state action decisions 
as having found the nongovernmental actors themselves constitutionally liable.  See id. at 
776; see also Glennon & Nowak, supra note 233, at 255-57 (discussing Court’s confusion 
about whether state action inquiry goes to action or actor).
245 The private power insight forces defenders of the public-private distinction into a 
posture of relativism.  See, e.g., Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 138 (“[W]hich particular 
private powers are ‘too powerful’ is generally a matter of controversy.  It is difficult to 
imagine how ‘too powerful’ could be defined as a matter of constitutional principle.”).  They 
simply deem government categorically different, denying any need to prove their position.
246 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 536-38 (dismantling argument that 
state action doctrine protects liberty interests).
247 Id. at 537.
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2.  Anger: Ideological Critiques
Building on the ontological critics’ insight that public and private 
spheres are legally indistinguishable, a distinct set of critiques of the 
public-private distinction contends that our legal system has maintained 
the distinction as an ideological construct.  On this view, the ontological 
critique points the way to a deeper understanding that the public-private 
distinction in constitutional law serves entrenched interests by preventing 
departures from established arrangements of power.248  The distinction 
elevates the rights of powerful institutions over those of less powerful 
individuals while preventing government, particularly courts, from 
intervening in the conflict on the individuals’ behalf.249  As Paul Brest 
notes: “The state action doctrine . . . has seldom been used to shelter 
citizens from coercive federal or judicial power.  More often, it has been
employed to protect the autonomy of business enterprises against the 
claims of consumers, minorities, and other relatively powerless 
citizens.”250  Courts employ the public-private distinction to mark public 
power as the only threat to constitutional freedoms while concealing 
private exercises of coercive authority.251  This process perpetuates 
economic, racial, and gender inequities.
Legal realists and their inheritors in the critical legal studies movement 
have advanced this ideological critique in economic terms.  Aiming at the 
heart of the traditionally conceptualized private sphere, these critics have 
emphasized the structures of coercion and domination inherent in the 
supposedly nongovernmental domains of property and contract.  They 
emphasize the historical development of the public-private distinction as an 
advanced capitalist legal device to safeguard private transactions from 
248 Karl Klare’s deconstruction of the public-private distinction’s role in labor law 
illustrates well the progression from the ontological critique to an indictment of the 
distinction as ideologically driven.  See Karl E. Klare, The Public / Private Distinction in 
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
249 See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635, 1639 
(1998) (“Traditional law, as embodied in the state action doctrine, creates a bright-line rule 
that the private institution always wins and the individual fired or disciplined by it for 
expression always loses.”) (hereinafter Chemerinsky, More Speech).
250 Brest, supra note 201, at 1330; see also Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403 (positing 
that, “given our society’s stated commitment to norms of equality, a great deal of the way 
things actually are would not survive” elimination of the state action doctrine)..
251 See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence – A First Step by Way of 
the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 395 (1983) 
(explaining how then-Justice Rehnquist’s conception of public-private distinction made 
power “a derivative, and not an originating, concept”); Peller, supra note 201, at 1288 
(explaining that, under public-private distinction, “democratic political practice . . . is 
represented as having a monopoly on social power” while “[e]verything outside the purview 
of this realm . . . is not viewed as an exercise of social power”).
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redistributive initiatives, which may be framed as constitutional rights 
claims.252  Karl Klare’s exhaustive survey of labor law doctrine leads him to 
conclude that the public-private distinction as applied to labor disputes 
serves “the effort to induce the belief that workers should be denied power 
and participation in industrial life.”253  Given the Court’s repeated tendency 
to invoke the state action doctrine to shield such institutions as utilities,254
bailees,255 and medical facilities256 from constitutional liability, 
commentators emphasize how the distinction aids powerful institutions in 
fending off rights claims brought by individuals.257  In short, the state action 
doctrine safeguards the status quo.
Invocations of the state action doctrine to block constitutional claims 
have often provided cover for institutionalized racism.258  Professor Black 
maintained near the height of the Civil Rights Era that the state action 
doctrine served only that purpose.259  Although almost all of the Supreme 
Court decisions that have appreciably expanded the scope of “state 
action” rebuffed acts of discrimination against African Americans,260
252 See Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1424-26 (demonstrating that legal 
concepts of public and private crystallized only with consolidation of market capitalism in 
the 19th century); Peller, supra note 201, at 1194-1207 (tracing development of public-
private distinction in 19th Century liberty-of-contract jurisprudence).
253 Klare, supra note 246, at 1418.
254 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that state-
licensed monopolistic utility was not bound to provide procedural due process when it shut 
off customer’s electric service for nonpayment). 
255 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that warehouse’s sale of 
goods it held to satisfy lien under Uniform Commercial Code not state action).
256 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that government 
reimbursements for care of Medicaid patients did not subject nursing home’s transfer of 
those patients to less expensive facilities to procedural due process requirements).
257 See REICH, supra note 238, at 35-38 (discussing how corporations’ freedom from 
constitutional liability allows them to undermine personal freedoms); Casebeer, supra note 
249, at 422-23 (contending that state action doctrine “masks classist protection of capital 
including warehouses, private utilities, private drinking clubs, private hospitals and private 
schools”) (footnotes omitted); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 539 ([A]llowing 
the concept of state action to determine when rights are protected undermines liberty by 
allowing all private invasions of rights, even when the balance completely favors the 
victims.”).
258 See Hale, supra note 237, at 639 (charging that state action doctrine “makes a 
mockery of the Court’s solemn declaration that Negroes have a constitutional right not to be 
segregated”); Strauss, State Action, supra note 159, at 411-14 (describing obstructionist role 
of state action limitation during Civil Rights Era).
259 See Black, supra note 199, at 90 (contending that state action doctrine’s “one 
practical function” in constitutional law was to “immunize[] racist prejudices from 
constitutional control”); see also id. at 70 (“‘Separate but equal’ and ‘no state action’ – these 
fraternal twins have been the Medusan caryatids upholding racial injustice.”).
260 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding judicial 
assignment of liability for defamation to be state action that violated First Amendment, 
where defendants in defamation action were African-American civil rights advocates); 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding exclusion of African-
American customers by restaurant in government-owned building to be state action that 
violated Equal Protection Clause); Reitman v. Mulkey, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding state 
constitutional provision that prohibited ordinances barring private racial discrimination in 
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critical scholars have demonstrated that systems of private ordering 
continue to disadvantage African Americans and other minority groups 
by insulating oppressive features of the status quo from legal challenge.261
Critical race theory posits that limiting constitutional protections to the 
public sphere makes no sense in a society that disadvantages people of 
color in most other aspects of life.262  Dividing the world into public and 
private spheres forces constitutional challengers to overcome a putatively 
“common sense” distinction that actually owes its status to past judicial 
decisions.263  The state action doctrine acts as a shield, allowing courts to 
avoid balancing underlying competing constitutional interests.264
Furthermore, critical race theorists contend that the denial of a private 
cause of action based on equal protection grounds, combined with the 
protection of other constitutional provisions – primarily due process and 
First Amendment protections – creates a “private right to discriminate.”265
Not only does this right legitimate private discrimination, it hinders 
passage of antidiscrimination legislation in areas such as economic 
relations.266  Finally, critical race theorists emphasize the realist insight 
that governmental facilitation and protection of discriminatory conduct 
amounts to a higher level of state action that the courts have still refused 
to recognize.267
Feminist legal theory has emphasized the role of the public-private 
distinction in sustaining patriarchal authority.  The distinction fosters an 
housing to be state action that violated Equal Protection Clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenant to be state action 
that violated Equal Protection Clause).
261 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: 
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1998) 
(discussing tendency of private social arrangements to perpetuate inequalities and evade 
constitutional checks).
262 See Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against 
Racism: Perspectives from Labor and Civil Rights Law, 61 ORE. L. REV. 157, 180 (1982) 
(discussing connection between public/private and substance/form dichotomies in relation to 
race cases); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 446-47 (1990) (highlighting idea that privacy has 
more worth to those with the means of taking advantage of it).
263 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 1991 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
12-14 (arguing that division along public and private lines is a normative process that 
obscures political reasoning behind designations).
264 See Lawrence, supra note 260, at 446-47 (1990) (contending that state action 
doctrine provides formalistic basis for resolving substantive conflicts between constitutional 
values).
265 Gotanda, supra note 261, at 10-12 (illustrating that there exists an area where 
neither judicial decisions nor legislative enactments may permissibly prevent private 
discrimination).  
266 Id. at 11-12.
267 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2378-79 (arguing that characterization of racist speech as 
private ignores both passive and active roles state plays in its propagation).
46
illusion that women possess autonomy while simultaneously insulating 
structures that oppress women from legal challenges.268  “Freedom from 
public intervention,” states Catharine MacKinnon, “coexists uneasily with 
any right that requires social preconditions [in order] to be meaningfully 
delivered.”269  In rape law, the public-private distinction discourages legal 
attention to sexual violence, even though such violence represents the 
dominant exercise of coercive power in many women’s lives, because 
rape results from nominally private action.270  At the same time, the law 
treats consent to sex as presumptively voluntary by locating sex in the 
private sphere, where people are presumed to make autonomous 
choices.271  Legal approaches to family life depend on a subdivision of the 
private sphere into the distinct domains of the economic marketplace and 
the home.  Women have historically faced exclusion from the public 
sphere and the marketplace,272 while the law has shielded the “private” 
domain of the home from many forms of regulation.273  Thus, even though 
the workplace has become subject to substantial government regulation, 
the law ignores many women’s status as unpaid full-time laborers in their 
own homes because it identifies the home with the private sphere.274  On 
the same basis, the legal idea of family privacy insulates many marital 
conflicts from legal regulation or liability.275
Laying bare the ideological skeleton of the public-private distinction 
provides additional responses to the distinction’s libertarian defenders.  
The social fact that private institutions often match or exceed 
268 See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public-Private Distinction, 45 CAL. L. REV. 
1,17, 20 (1992) (summarizing feminist accounts of ways in which public-private distinction 
conceals women’s lack of volition and structural oppression).
269 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989).
270 See KELMAN, supra note 226, at 199 (emphasizing pervasiveness of sexual violence 
in women’s lives); MACKINNON, supra note 267, at 191 (“To confront the fact that women 
have no privacy is to confront the intimate degradation of women as the public order.”).  For 
a thorough discussion of background features of state rape laws that exacerbate women’s 
vulnerability to sexual violence, see Michelle A. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the 
Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 907, 924-39 (2001).
271 See Peller, supra note 201, at 1195 (comparing liberty of contract and sexual consent 
as ideological constructs based on presumptions of privacy).  This same view of sex as 
voluntary supports the framing of abortion rights in privacy terms.  See MACKINNON, supra
note 267, at 184-94 (criticizing privacy basis for abortion rights on ground that sex for 
women is not a matter of free choice); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s 
Subordination and the Role of Law, in DAVID KAIRYS ED., THE POLITICS OF LAW 151, 157-60 
(2nd ed. 1990) (same).
272 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 269, at 152-54 (presenting historical and 
conceptual overview of women’s legal exclusion from public sphere).
273 See Gavison, supra note 266, at 21-22 (discussing home-market division); Taub & 
Schneider, supra note 269, at 154-58 (presenting historical and conceptual overview of 
absence of law in private sphere).
274 See MACKINNON, supra note 267, at 67 (explaining advocacy of wages for 
housework).
275 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 269, at 154-56 (discussing property rules, tort 
law, rape, and battery).
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government’s capacity to threaten personal freedom276 becomes, in the 
ideological critics’ analysis, more than a mere refutation of the public-
private distinction’s logic.  Rather, the ideological critics view that 
seeming illogic as a smokescreen for a deliberate maintenance of standing 
power relationships.277  They add that private institutions, unlike 
governments, are not politically accountable to citizens.278  Thus, they 
contend that governmental intervention in nongovernmental relationships 
can be highly beneficial and that judicial enforcement of rights against 
nongovernmental institutions can be constitutionally valid.279  They also 
maintain that courts should have authority to hold private entities 
themselves liable for rights violations, rather than having to assign 
liability to state actors with only indirect responsibility for the 
violations.280  The ideological critique reveals that libertarian defenders of 
the public-private distinction rely on a politically charged vision of 
“liberty.”
The ideological critics build on the insights of the ontological critics, 
taking realist insights about the incoherence of the public-private 
distinction in what is nominally a more radical direction.  Unlike the 
ontological critique, however, the ideological critique implies a basis for 
partially reconciling the concept of the private in constitutional law.  To 
condemn the state action doctrine as ideologically determined 
presupposes, at a minimum, that the public-private distinction has some 
coherent meaning.  That premise, in turn, opens up the possibility of 
reconceptualizing the distinction in constitutional law to serve more 
desirable normative ends.  This is the direction in which the final 
significant critique of the public private distinction has moved.
276 See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
277 See Casebeer, supra note 249, at 422 (contending that the Court, by enforcing state 
action limitation, “uses an incoherent doctrine to hide a necessarily unstable sphere of 
private right protected by the Constitution”); Peller, supra note 201, at 1208-13 (explaining 
circularity of state action analysis as reflecting ideological perspective that views private 
sphere as temporally preceding public sphere). 
278 See REICH, supra note 238, at 37 (“The rules that corporations make and enforce are 
not adopted democratically, nor are they enforced with the fairness required by due process 
of law.”); Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 511 (emphasizing need for judicial 
protection against infringements of rights by nongovernmental actors); Tushnet, supra note 
205, at 392 (contending that freedom from political accountability can render corporations 
more threatening to rights than government).
279 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 247, at 1637-38 (describing value of 
imposing governmental free speech norms on certain private institutions).
280 See Casebeer, supra note 249, at 413 (“Responsibility for the consequences of public 
power should not cease merely because those injured by its exercise cannot find a state 
actor triggerman in a situation where the public power organizes a pattern of acceptable 
social relations.”); but see Larry Alexander, The Public-Private Distinction and 
Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST. COMM. 361, 371-72 (1993) (asserting 
that “any constitutional challenge to the exercise of private power can and should be 
recharacterized as a constitutional challenge to . . . background laws”).
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3. Acceptance: Rehabilitating the Public-Private 
Distinction
The ontological and ideological critiques of the public-private distinction 
in constitutional law carry great persuasive force.  Those critiques, however, 
have permeated the legal literature for years, and the distinction still occupies 
a central place in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights.  As no less 
ambitious a critical scholar than Mark Tushnet has acknowledged, the 
persistence of a legal doctrine against years of withering critical attacks 
strongly suggests “that the doctrine is doing something to which the critics 
are not attending.”281  Recent analysis of the public-private distinction in 
constitutional law has therefore focused on justifying the distinction in light 
of the complaints against it.  Unfortunately, many such efforts have made 
one of two mistakes.
The first mistake, the “useful fiction” fallacy, has been to retain the 
facade of something called “the public-private distinction” while building 
an entirely different doctrine behind it.  William Marshall, for example, 
argues that courts require some sort of “guideline” to avoid the 
difficulties of balancing competing interests.282  He nominates the state 
action doctrine for the task: “Given the extreme difficulty of choosing 
between competing rights in the first place, perhaps the decision to 
insulate private activity from constitutional scrutiny is justified as a way 
to avoid forcing judges to make impossible decisions.”283  A more 
pessimistic, and perhaps more forthright, version of Marshall’s argument 
is Tushnet’s suggestion that constitutional law needs the public-private 
distinction because our jurisprudence has failed to generate what should 
stand in the distinction’s place – a substantive understanding of 
constitutional rights.284  Conversely, Robert Glennon and John Nowak 
attempt to portray the state action doctrine as an implicit balancing 
analysis, calling it “merely the Court’s chosen manner of determining 
whether the challenged nongovernmental act is compatible with the 
281 Tushnet, supra note 205, at 391; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1698 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that persistence of public-private 
distinction renders critics “both correct and irrelevant”).  For an examination of possible 
explanations for the vitality of the public-private distinction, see Berman, supra note 200, 
at 1284-89.
282 See Marshall, supra note 196, at 363.
283 Id. (footnote omitted). Marshall decries the idea that judges should replace the state 
action doctrine with a balancing of constitutional interests on the ground that such 
balancing “will create a class of constitutional ‘losers.’”  Id.  He fails to consider the 
numerous constitutional claimants who “lose” when courts dismiss their claims under the 
state action doctrine.
284 See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403 (“The state action doctrine, incoherent though it 
may be, is perhaps a useful mask to disguise the incoherence of substantive constitutional 
law.”); see also Horwitz, Rights, supra note 73, at 405 & n.74 (explaining that state action 
doctrine preserves traditional liberal distinction between social and political equality).
NONGOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF WARTIME 
DEBATE
49
substantive guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”285  One problem 
with treating the public-private distinction as a useful fiction is the 
increased danger that courts will overreach by misrepresenting what they 
are doing.286  Another problem is that this sort of subterfuge implicitly 
attributes the persistence of the distinction to ignorance, and its architects 
make the suspect assumption that they can fool the ignorant while 
advancing some preferred value.
The second mistake, the “square one” fallacy, entails reconstructing 
the rigid public-private distinction in all its incoherent, ideologically 
charged ignominy.   Christopher Stone, for instance, portrays the 
obligations traditionally associated with government as mechanisms to 
enforce virtuous behavior.287  For Stone, extending this enforcement to a 
“private” sphere, specifically corporations, would “unacceptably extend 
the power and reach of government.”288 Accordingly, Stone draws a 
public-private boundary that relieves entities not generally perceived as 
“public” of “public” obligations289 and “most nearly assigns the [‘public’ 
liability] burden to general revenues.”290  Richard Kay likewise bases his 
analysis of the state action doctrine on an assertion about the special 
danger of governmental power.  Kay acknowledges the ontological 
critique291 and the critical insight that nongovernmental power centers 
have achieved great prominence in contemporary society.292  He argues, 
however, that the Constitution, unlike other sources of legal authority, 
should constrain only the formal making and enforcement of laws.293  Kay 
285 Glennon & Nowak, supra note 233, at 229; see also Steve Bachmann & Andrew 
Weltchek, Book Review, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1078, 1086 (1983) (arguing for maintenance of 
public-private distinction “as a tool to be used for political protection from various forms of 
persecution, if for no other reason”) (reviewing DAVID KAIRYS ED., THE POLITICS OF LAW (1st
ed. 1982)); Graglia, supra note 191, at 784 (extolling reinvigoration of state action doctrine 
as an “essential, albeit illogical” limit on “the application of unjustifiable constitutional 
restrictions that have resulted from decades of judicial hyperactivity”).
286 See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 404 (criticizing “Bickelian prudentialist” claim that 
state action doctrine is a useful fiction).
287 Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private 
Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1494-96 (1982).
288 Id. at 1494.
289 See id. at 1497 (“[I]t is true that General Motors is big and powerful; nonetheless, 
its actions are not likely to be interpreted as the expression of the collective will.”).
290 Id. at 1498.
291 “Maintenance of the public-private distinction . . . creates an inescapable problem of 
self-reference: the Constitution is concerned only with public things and not with private 
things.  The determination of the content of the categories of public and private things is a 
public thing.”  Kay, supra  note 196, at 337 (footnote omitted).
292 See id. at 350 (noting argument “that the relative dangers from public and 
ostensibly private sources of power may be considerably different today than when the 
relevant constitutional provisions were enacted”).
293 See id. at 342-43 (defending limitation of constitutional law to field of “lawmaking” 
as necessary to preserve “distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law”).
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justifies this rigid limitation as providing “the security that may be 
derived from the existence of stable and knowable limits on the power of 
the state.”294  The problem with the square one fallacy is that those who 
commit it, while paying lip service to critical insights, end up 
reconstructing the public-private distinction as a device to insulate 
entrenched ideas about limited government and corporate license.
If rehabilitation of the constitutional public-private distinc tion, in light of 
the distinction’s conceptual weaknesses, should not take the form of a façade 
for preferred values or a reconstruction of fallacies, what form should it take?  
Any attempt to answer this question requires an acknowledgement that the 
analysis has too many and broad implications to allow confidence that any 
theory will be generally valid or free of unforeseen flaws.  The reason to 
forge on past this hesitation is that, once we realize the inadequacy of the 
doctrinal status quo, the question requires an answer.
C.Developing a Useful Role for the Public-Private 
Distinction in Constitutional Adjudication
Our constitutional system reflexively gives the abstract, formal idea of 
“the private” a centrality that properly belongs to a closely related but 
significantly different idea the integrity of natural persons.  Our deepest 
intuitions about the substance and limits of constitutional rights concern 
individuals’ decisions to behave as they choose, and courts’ understandings 
about constitutional rights should reflect those intuitions.  Shifting our 
attention from the abstract private sphere to the concept of personal integrity 
has important consequences both for determining which entities bear 
constitutional obligations and for defining the substance of constitutional 
rights.  Once the idea of personal integrity underwrites our notion of 
immunity from constitutional liability, nongovernmental institutions have no 
special, presumptive freedom from constitutional obligations, as they do 
under the conventional public-private distinction.  At the same time, personal 
integrity provides a sounder basis than the bald designation “private” for 
asserting constitutional rights.  This section considers these ideas in the 
abstract; Part III uses them to build a new First Amendment model for 
dealing with nongovernmental assaults on wartime political debate.
Consideration of a genuine role for the public-private distinction in 
constitutional adjudication begins with a key insight of the distinction’s 
critics: Constitutional adjudication should focus on the substance of the 
asserted constitutional right at issue.  The traditional state action inquiry errs 
in replacing that substantive analysis with a formalistic inquiry into the 
defendant’s identity.  This critical insight has both descriptive and normative 
dimensions.  Descriptively, ontological critics insist that the state action 
doctrine is only comprehensible by reference to substantive theories of 
294 Id. at 360.
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rights.   Laurence Tribe posits that the Court’s rejection after 1937 of the 
unified theory of rights that had characterized the Lochner era left it bereft of 
a principled basis for determining when governmental acquiescence in 
private conduct gave rise to state action.295  His effort to make sense of the 
contemporary state action decisions entails seizing on substantive theories of 
particular rights where the Court has identified them.296  Normatively, 
ideological critics contend that the state action doctrine serves improperly to 
protect powerful nongovernmental institutions from substantively valid 
claims of rights violations.297
Abandoning the formal state action inquiry for a focus on the substance 
of rights does not mean, however, that every offense against a 
constitutionally ingrained interest is unconstitutional.298  Rather, that shift 
allows us to advance to the functional concern that the state action doctrine 
clumsily tries to address: Under what circumstances should courts treat an 
offense against constitutional interests as constitutionally unlawful?299  Most 
scholars respond that, at a minimum, the state does not act unconstitutionally 
when it facilitates a violation of one person’s constitutional interest in the 
name of another’s superior interest in privacy or autonomy.300  The familiar 
295 See TRIBE, supra note 279, at 1697.
296 See id. at 1714-15 (criticizing Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948), for insufficient attention to substantive conception of rights at issue); see also Brest, 
supra note 201, at 1302 (stating that legal positivism requires “a substantive, normative 
theory of rights” to sustain public-private distinction); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 383 
(contending that “there can be no doctrine of state action that is independent of the 
applicable substantive constitutional law.”).
297 Numerous other commentators have called for replacing the conventional state 
action doctrine with a focus on substantive rights.  See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra
note 194, at 550-51 (advocating abolition of state action doctrine in favor of rights focus); 
Horowitz, supra note 226, at 221 (proposing inquiry focused on the relationship among state 
authority, the nongovernmental violation of rights, and the degree of the deprivation of 
rights); Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 191, at 7-8 (criticizing state action doctrine 
because “it directs attention to formal questions instead of the real interests which compete 
for constitutional recognition” and outlining interests court should take into account).
298 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 506 (noting that, even in absence 
of state action doctrine, nongovernmental actors may be able to justify their behavior in 
ways government cannot).
299 One obvious class of private violations of rights that could not give rise to 
constitutional liability even absent the state action doctrine are those for which the law 
provides an adequate remedy.  See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 551-52 
(explaining that presence of legal remedies would prevent most ordinary crimes and torts 
from becoming constitutionally actionable); Tushnet, supra note 205, at 395-96 (stating that 
putatively unreasonable search by private detective would not be a constitutional violation 
if state law made the search unlawful).
300 See Black, supra note 199, at 101 (advocating “the limitation of the fourteenth 
amendment when it collides with another constitutional guarantee”); Brest, supra note 201, 
at 1323 (explaining persistence of state action doctrine in terms of “our psychological and 
ideological need to believe that there are essentially private realms . . . in which actions are 
autonomous”); Henkin, supra note 228, at 487 (discussing “exceptional category” of equal 
protection cases in which “there exist, against the claim of equality, important 
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hypothetical is that of the racist dinner host.  If every action is state action, 
may a court compel me to invite an African American to dinner at my home 
if I hate African Americans?  The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee 
compels courts to prevent exclusions based on race; at the same time, the 
Constitution’s due process guarantee establishes a zone of privacy in the 
home.  Enjoining the racist dinner host is out of bounds, not because his 
action is not “state action” – the law of trespass necessarily underwrites the 
power to exclude people from one’s home – but because a superior 
constitutional value is at stake.301  On this basis, critics of the public-private 
distinction usually conclude that courts should abandon the distinction in 
favor of directly balancing competing constitutional interests.302
At this point, however, a problem arises.  What makes the racist 
dinner host’s due process interest superior to the excluded guest’s equal 
protection interest?  Couldn’t the same argument effectively subordinate 
any equal protection claim to a defendant’s asserted “privacy” interest in, 
for example, refusing to serve or hire African Americans?  Insulating 
certain decisions from constitutional accountability simply because of 
their “private” character seems to entail devolution to the formalism of 
the state action doctrine.303  As a practical matter, this problem far 
countervailing rights of liberty and privacy that enjoy substantial constitutional 
protection”).  One consequence of this view is that nongovernmental defendants can assert 
against constitutional claims certain interests that are not available to the government.  See
Alexander, supra note 278, at 365 “To say . . . that the realm of the private is defined and 
buttressed by law . . . is not to say that private choices within it are held to the same 
standards as the Constitution imposes on, say, the state police or a welfare department.”); 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 537-38 (noting that, even absent state action 
doctrine, personal liberty interests often would shield nongovernmental actors from liability 
where similar action by government would be unconstitutional).
301 Variations on this analysis of the hypothetical appear in Chemerinsky, Rethinking, 
supra note 194, at 538; Hale, supra note 237, at 629-30; Henkin, supra note 228, at 770; 
Williams, supra note 226, at 368.
302 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 538-39 (calling for abandonment of 
state action doctrine in favor of balancing approach); Henkin, supra note 228, at 488 
(maintaining that balancing of equality interests against liberty and property interests is 
unavoidable); Williams, supra note 226, at 389-90 (urging focus on “the merits of 
accommodating the interests” rather than “the nature of a formula which is irrelevant to 
the interests involved”).  One analysis in the mid-1970s argued that the Court actually was 
using a balancing analysis in the guise of the state action doctrine.  See Glennon & Nowak, 
supra note 233, at 227.
303 Professor Tushnet expresses a concern that, absent a public-private distinction in 
constitutional law, judges will tend to identify and elevate privacy rights to defeat novel 
equality claims out of reluctance to disturb the status quo.  See Tushnet, supra note 205, at 
406 (arguing that “the collapse of the [state action] doctrine into substantive constitutional 
law forces the courts between doing everything and doing nothing”) (footnote omitted).  A 
reason not to take Tushnet’s concern so seriously as to perpetuate the present role of the 
public-private distinction in constitutional law is that courts frequently use the state action 
doctrine to do exactly what Tushnet warns against.  See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (labeling parade organizers who sought to 
exclude gay marchers as private actors while effectively treating putative gay marchers as 
state actors because they invoked state antidiscrimination law).  A variation on Tushnet’s 
concern is that eliding the state action doctrine, by broadening the Constitution’s coverage, 
would result in watered down constitutional protections.  See Garvey, supra note 214, at 
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outstrips the wildly hypothetical notion that anyone would invoke judicial 
power to invade someone else’s dining room.304
Louis Henkin’s 40-year old consideration of the problem provides the 
essence of a solution.  Henkin maintains that “a small area of liberty [is] 
favored by the Constitution even over claims to equality.”305  He would 
have courts balance competing rights depending on the extent to which 
the defendant’s discrimination touches community affairs.  Thus, a court 
should enforce the theoretical claim of the racist dinner host because his 
interest is entirely insular.306  In contrast, the court should not allow a 
shopkeeper to discriminate based on race, because such discrimination “is 
public, blatant, and widespread; the inequality and indignity therefore 
notorious and extensive, with important communal consequences” and 
“the relationship of owner to prospective clients and that of customers 
with each other are superficial, not intimate.”307
A practical distinction between insular and communal decisions 
corresponds to the descriptive difference between natural persons and 
institutions.  Accordingly, courts should treat natural persons – not every 
legal entity that populates an abstract private sphere – as the locus of 
constitutional rights adjudication.  Emphasis on the rights of natural persons 
is a familiar element in liberal theories of rights.308  Although the concept of 
the “natural person” presents its own conceptual problems, it effectively 
deline ates the intimate interests, preferences, and relationships that every 
individual in a democratic system should be entitled to control for herself.
314-15 (discussing role of state action doctrine in preserving Constitution’s “economy of 
restraint”); Marshall, supra note 196, at 567 (“The more broadly rights are drawn, the more 
difficult it becomes to enforce those rights stringently.”).  Whatever the merits of that 
objection, the substantive approach this Article takes to First Amendment theory defuses it 
by advocating a narrower substantive scope for expressive freedom under the First 
Amendment.  See supra section I.A.2. (describing public rights theory of expressive 
freedom).
304 See Black, supra note 199, at 101 (“No suit is of record in which the prayer was for a 
mandatory injunction that a dinner invitation issue.”).
305 Henkin, supra note 228, at 496.
306 See id. at 498.
307 Id. at 499; see also Black, supra note 199, at 101 (contending that privacy interests 
should not bar constitutional claims “where the problem is in the public life of the 
community”).
308 Martha Nussbaum has emphasized “the separateness of persons” as an essential 
component of liberal theory.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 62 (2000).  
She explains this concept as reflecting 
the basic fact that each person has a course from birth to death that is 
not precisely the same as that of any other person; that each person is 
one and not more than one, that each feels pain in his or her own body, 
that the food given to A does not arrive in the stomach of B.
Id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 at 131 
(1993) (“Our sense of what it is to have and exercise freedom is bound up with our 
conception of ourselves as persons and of our relation to value, other people, society and the 
causal order of the world.”).
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First, only natural persons should enjoy presumptive immunity from 
constitutional obligations.  Courts should not, as the state action doctrine 
directs, afford every nongovernmental institution a presumptive license to 
violate constitutional rights.  Rather, they should extend that license only to 
natural persons, leaving nongovernmental institutions presumptively subject 
to constitutional obligations.  Courts may, and no doubt should, grant various 
nongovernmental institutions, in particular circumstances, freedom to 
disregard constitutional norms.309  Such determinations, however, should 
require specific reasons, not the mere imprimatur of “the private.”
Second, and closely related, only natural persons should presumptively 
enjoy constitutional rights.  Commentators frequently assert that the 
conventional public-private distinction is necessary to make a system of 
rights coherent, because the idea of the private is necessary for distinguishing 
rights-holders from the government.310  The reach of that assertion, however, 
exceeds its grasp.  A coherent system of rights requires courts only to 
distinguish natural persons from institutions.311  As in the matter of 
immunities, courts may extend rights to various institutions, but only for 
particular reasons, as where institutional rights are instrumentally necessary 
to effectuate the rights of natural persons.
Understanding the role of personal integrity in securing any given 
constitutional right requires a substantive theory of the right at issue.  The 
concept of personal integrity has obvious salience for some areas of 
constitutional protection, such as rights of privacy.  Less obvious, but equally 
important, is the significance of personal integrity for the public rights theory 
of expressive freedom.  This article now returns to the First Amendment and 
considers how the foregoing analysis of the public-private distinction should 
lead courts to address nongovernmental suppression of wartime political 
debate and dissent.
309 I discuss this proviso in the First Amendment context infra notes 330-35 and 
accompanying text.
310 Tushnet, supra note 205, at 403; see also Seidman, supra note 197, at 393 (“All 
substantive rights rest on the assumption that we can define a sphere of private conduct not 
attributable to the state.”); Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 191, at 7 (“[W]hile the search 
for a merely formal connection – for ‘state action’ – is misleading, the search for the values 
which stand behind the state action limitation is indispensable.”).
311 Professor Schwarzschild, in my view, errs when he insists on “a principle” to justify 
our intuitions about this close form of privacy.  Schwarzschild, supra note 159, at 135-36.  
The determination is necessarily normative.  Thus, Henkin incisively notes that “we are 
invoking ‘substantive due process’ – or something quite like it – to form an exception or a 
reasonable classification under the equal protection clause.”  Henkin, supra note 228, at 
504.  That analysis becomes even more interesting in light of the Court’s subsequent, 
normatively charged revival of substantive due process to protect the very sort of privacy 
interest Henkin describes.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking 
down state prohibition on “sodomy” as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
due process principle).
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III.APPLYING THE PUBLIC RIGHTS FIRST 
AMENDMENT TO NONGOVERNMENTAL 
CENSORSHIP OF WARTIME POLITICAL DEBATE
This part considers how a public rights account of the First 
Amendment should accommodate the public-private distinction in the 
particular context of nongovernmental constraints on wartime political 
debate and dissent.  The first section articulates general principles for 
invoking the First Amendment to enjoin nongovernmental suppression of 
political speech.  If, as the public rights theory maintains, the First 
Amendment exists to guarantee the robust exchange of ideas necessary 
for self-government, then our habit of shielding “private” actions from 
First Amendment constraints must yield where those actions seriously 
compromise political debate.  At the same time, individuals must 
maintain sufficient autonomy to process information, formulate positions 
about political matters, and assess alternative viewpoints.
The second section applies the principles of the first in the specific 
context of nongovernmental suppression of wartime debate.  It contends 
that courts should apply the First Amendment to enjoin many 
nongovernmental constraints on political speech in times of war and 
national emergency.  The extreme value and vulnerability of robust 
political debate in wartime312 makes this an important testing ground for 
my thesis.  The third section addresses some concerns about assigning 
federal courts the duty to remedy nongovernmental constraints on 
expression.
A.The Role of Personal Integrity in Applying the Public 
Rights First Amendment
The public rights theory of expressive freedom has a complicated 
relationship with the public-private distinction.  On one hand, the public 
rights theory gives the processes of government central importance.  
Meiklejohn accords First Amendment protection only to “the freedom of 
public discussion,”313 limiting individuals’ “private right of speech” to the 
procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment.314  My own terms for 
democracy-based and autonomy-based approaches to the First 
312 See supra Part I.  The task of distinguishing times of war and national emergency 
requires a functional inquiry.  In general, courts will have to determine whether the 
importance and vulnerability of political speech in particular circumstances warrants 
enforcing the First Amendment against nongovernmental actors.
313 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 37.
314 Id.
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Amendment – “public rights” and “private rights” – echo the public-
private distinction.  On the other hand, the public rights theory recognizes 
a convergence between the public and private spheres.315  Because the 
theory emphasizes a substantive bottom line of democratic discourse, it 
recognizes the danger nongovernmental power can pose for expressive 
freedom316 and trusts government in some circumstances to advance 
expressive freedom.317  At a deeper level, the rigid public-private 
distinction’s reification of atomistic individualism is antithetical to the 
public rights theory’s emphasis on the public interest as the object of 
political deliberation.318
The challenge that the idea of the private poses for the public rights 
theory animates Meiklejohn’s treatment of art and literature.  By limiting 
the First Amendment’s protection to political speech, he consigns 
“private” categories of speech to the procedural protections of the Due 
Process Clause.319  At the same time, Meiklejohn acknowledges that art 
and literature – which in a sense are quintessentially private forms of 
expression – can exert powerful influences over people’s decisions about 
how to approach political issues.  Accordingly, the First Amendment 
must protect art for the same reasons it protects facially political speech: 
so that citizens have access to the full range of inputs that enhance their 
wisdom as self-governors.320  Although the public rights theory disdains 
the pride of place that the private rights theory accords to individual 
autonomy, Meiklejohn’s treatment of art affirms that no community can 
exist, let alone govern itself, without the conscientious independence of 
the individuals who constitute it.  Likewise, the category of “political 
315 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1985-87 (describing public-private convergence 
under public rights theory).
316 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, More Speech, supra note 247, at 1641 (“The reality is that 
when private institutions prohibit and punish expression there is a loss of speech, just as 
when the government prohibits and punishes expression.”).
317 See, e.g., Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 64, at 783 (contending that “the first 
amendment . . . points toward the necessity of the activist state”); Sunstein, Free Speech, 
supra note 65, at 288-89 (advocating government action to ensure that broadcast media 
advance First Amendment values).  Both Fiss and Sunstein forswear any direct attack on 
the public-private distinction.  See Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 64, at 1414 (“Nothing I 
have said is meant to destroy the distinction presupposed by classical liberalism between 
state and citizen, or between the public and private.”); Sunstein, supra, at 267 (maintaining 
“that the First Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that private conduct 
raises no constitutional question”).  Each, however, advocates doctrinal shifts that would 
require courts to rethink the uses of the distinction in constitutional law.  See supra notes 
64-70 and accompanying text.
318 Compare Hor[]witz, Public-Private, supra note 201, at 1427 (tying vitality of public-
private distinction to widespread rejection of the notion of a substantive public interest) 
(hereinafter) with Magarian, supra note 9, at 1980-82 (discussing central importance of 
substantive public interest in public rights theory of expressive freedom).
319 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 79-80.
320 See id. at 117 (noting value of art and literature for political deliberation); Sunstein, 
Free Speech, supra note 65, at  304 (acknowledging political content of some art and 
literature).
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issues” expands with our understanding that institutions outside 
government often make decisions that broadly affect the political 
community and thus become proper, even necessary, objects of 
democratic discourse.
The public rights theory’s emphasis on deliberative democracy makes 
the concept of personal integrity essential for expressive freedom.  In 
order for the First Amendment to ensure robust democratic discourse, it 
must respect a zone of individual conscience that allows people to 
evaluate information, formulate ideas, and participate meaningfully in 
democratic processes.  This conception of personal integrity embodies a 
functional corollary to the public rights theory’s recognition of a public-
private convergence.  The public-private distinction should inform First 
Amendment analysis only to the extent the distinction serves the core 
First Amendment value of participatory democracy.  Respecting a zone of 
individual conscience shields members of the political community from 
any conceivable First Amendment liability while also identifying them as 
First Amendment rights-holders.321  The essential role of individual 
conscience in collective self-government is what puts the “rights” in the 
public rights First Amendment.  The importance of allowing individuals 
to exercise their conscientious faculties in political processes precludes 
any First Amendment check on their treatment of others’ speech.
In contrast, nongovernmental institutions are not members of the 
political community, nor do they possess the similar sort of individual 
privacy interest, predicated on the Due Process Clause, that can properly 
fend off constitutional claims in general.322  In fact, the economic power 
of many nongovernmental institutions makes them significant threats to 
public rights of expressive freedom,323 a fact that justifies courts in 
enjoining nongovernmental interference with political debate.324  That 
same economic power can transform institutions’ First Amendment 
claims into weapons against government reforms designed to enrich and 
broaden political debate.325  As I discuss below, many nongovernmental 
321 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.  Under the public rights theory, 
nonmembers of the political community may be appropriate First Amendment claimants, to 
the extent their contributions to political dialogue advance deliberative democracy.  See 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 118-19 (discussing expressive freedom of noncitizens).
322 See supra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
323 Commentators in the public rights tradition since Meiklejohn have recognized 
threats to political expression, whether from governmental or nongovernmental sources, 
primarily in the allocation of expressive opportunities but have had less occasion to 
emphasize censorship of political debate.  See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
324 For a discussion of the necessity of direct injunctions against nongovernmental 
actors, see infra notes 440-43 and accompanying text.
325 See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (upholding 
corporations’ challenge to state’s ban on corporate contributions or expenditures in 
initiative or referendum campaigns).
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institutions make sufficiently important contributions to democratic 
discourse to warrant protecting their expressive autonomy.326
Determining when to extend such protection, however, requires a 
nuanced functional analysis – not merely a reflex to slap the label 
“private” on any institution outside government. 
Removing the public-private distinction’s automatic protection of 
nongovernmental censors would outrage defenders of the rigid public-
private distinction in First Amendment law, who condemn any notion of 
exposing nongovernmental institutions to First Amendment liability.327
Their objections would rest on two premises.  The first premise – that the 
First Amendment does nothing more or less than protect the speech of all 
nongovernmental entities, great and small, from governmental 
interference – clashes with the public rights theory’s fundamental 
commitment to a positive role for the First Amendment in promoting 
democratic discourse.328
The second premise for shielding nongovernmental institutions from 
First Amendment obligations is that government presents the only 
constitutionally cognizable threat to freedom because government enjoys 
a monopoly on the use of force.329  Government does enjoy unique power 
to wage war, a power whose distinctive importance for the common 
welfare animates this article’s argument.  Short of war, however, 
government’s ability to use force is less distinctive.330  Certain 
constitutional rights, notably those related to criminal procedure, may 
matter only in light of government’s unique attributes, but those attributes 
have only limited relevance for the capacity to suppress speech.  An 
employer that fires an employee for speaking, a shopping mall that 
excludes political protestors, or a broadcaster that buries a story critical 
of government policy does not need the threat of force.  It only needs the 
326 See infra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
328 Actually, the private rights theory may result in greater free speech protection for 
powerful institutional speakers than for individuals.  See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1955-
56.
329 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 93, at 538-39 (emphasizing government’s “unique . . . 
capacity to employ legitimized violence” as basis for public-private distinction in First 
Amendment context); see also supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (discussing 
nongovernmental institutions’ coercive capacity). 
330 Numerous corporations and other nongovernmental authorities employ armed 
security personnel.  True, those authorities require governmental permission before they 
can use force.  But that fact – even if we ignore private authorities’ practical capacity to use 
force illegally – merely underscores the government’s ability to distribute the power to use 
force to private authorities.  Through lobbying, private authorities can cash in their 
economic power for authority to use force.  Moreover, divisions of governing power under 
our constitutional scheme belie the vision of a monolithic, Hobbseian “state.”  Most First 
Amendment claims target actions of state and local governments.  Local governments 
employ force only on the authority of state governments, and state governments’ use of force 
under their police powers is subject to federal judicial oversight, congressional preemption, 
and superior federal military power.  Thus, most “state” First Amendment defendants enjoy 
no greater independence in the use of force than nongovernmental authorities do.
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authority that it maintains a prerogative to exercise over its employees, 
patrons, or reporters. 
Good reasons exist for taking governments very seriously as dangers 
to expressive freedom.  They exercise substantial control over people’s 
lives.  They employ enormous bureaucracies that often display no 
sensitivity to expressive rights and can suppress expression without any 
one person’s having to bear the legal and psychological burdens of 
responsibility.  Their interests frequently create significant incentives to 
censor speech.  Each of these statements, however, also describes private 
authorities in many situations.  Moreover, from a constitutional 
standpoint, private authorities carry the extra risk factor of immunity 
from direct political control.  Thus, judicial distinctions between 
governmental and nongovernmental authorities as threats to expressive 
freedom should be matters of degree and nuance, not of categorical 
certainty.331
Discarding the categorical distinction between governmental and 
nongovernmental authorities in First Amendment adjudication means that 
courts must articulate a reason, beyond the formal public-private 
distinction, for shielding any given nongovernmental institution from 
First Amendment liability or for allowing such an institution to raise First 
Amendment claims.  The principal possibility, applicable in cases that 
present conflicting First Amendment claims,332 is that a nongovernmental 
institution, by virtue of its distinctive characteristics, may make important 
contributions to democratic discourse that justify protection for its 
expressive conduct, including arguably expressive decisions to censor 
speech.333  Serious doubt exists whether some types of nongovernmental 
authorities – notably business corporations – contribute to democratic 
discourse in a manner that justifies broad First Amendment protection of 
their expressive activities.334  Other nongovernmental institutions, 
331 For a nuanced discussion, rooted in an autonomy-centered First Amendment theory, 
about the difficulties of counterbalancing governmental and nongovernmental threats to 
expressive freedom, see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of 
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (hereinafter Strauss, Persuasion).
332 A prominent descriptive insight of the public rights theory is that expressive 
freedom controversies often involve conflicting claims of speech rights. See Magarian, supra
note 9, at 1986-87; see also R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as 
Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335 (2001) (examining some implications of opposing 
free speech interests in First Amendment cases).  Restricting a nongovernmental entity’s 
ability to censor speech often entails, at least from the private entity’s standpoint, limiting 
the entity’s own supposed expressive rights.
333 Value for individuals’ understanding of political issues likewise provides the only 
basis on which an institution, as distinct from an individual, can raise a First Amendment 
claim under the public rights theory. 
334 Development of this point requires a more thorough assessment, under the public 
rights theory, of the idea that the First Amendment should protect corporations’ expressive 
freedom.  See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 478 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (positing 
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however, play valuable roles in maintaining robust democratic discourse, 
either as political associations of individuals335 or because they perform 
functions that promote political debate.336  Courts need to consider a 
given institution’s contributions to expressive freedom in assessing its 
claims for First Amendment protection or insulation from First 
Amendment obligations.337
A thorough assessment of how courts should decide whether and 
when to accord particular nongovernmental institutions First Amendment 
protections or immunities from First Amendment liability lies beyond the 
scope of this article.  Courts would need to develop a body of doctrine 
that assessed nongovernmental institutions’ First Amendment-styled 
claims and defenses in light of the public rights theory of expressive 
freedom.  My goal in this section has been to establish that the public 
rights theory requires a protected sphere of personal conscience and 
justifies substantial limits on the prerogatives of institutions to constrain 
political speech.  The next section turns to a particular context in which 
those principles compel imposition of First Amendment liability on 
nongovernmental institutions: suppression or censorship of wartime 
political debate.
B.Enjoining Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime 
Political Debate
According to the public rights theory of expressive freedom, robust 
political debate is essential in a democratic society for wise 
policymaking, and the value of debate is greatest when the stakes of 
necessity of corporate free speech for an informed electorate).
335 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (recognizing importance 
of associations’ advocacy role for public discourse).
336 The First Amendment’s Press Clause provides strong textual support for the 
intuition that the news media fall into this category.  See U.S. CONST. Amend. I, cl. 4.  For a 
discussion of how the First Amendment should affect news media failures to facilitate 
political debate, see supra section III.B.3.  The category of nongovernmental institutions 
that promote debate also would encompass publishers, insulating from First Amendment 
objections some of their economically motivated decisions to delay or not to publish 
particular works.  Similarly, universities’ and libraries’ contributions to democratic 
discourse would justify sparing them many First Amendment obligations.
337 Circumstances might conceivably arise in which a court could properly hold some 
nonspeech interest of a nongovernmental defendant to outweigh a First Amendment 
plaintiff’s expressive interest.  In general, however, the public rights theory’s narrow focus 
on political expression obviates the need for the sort of balancing common in present First 
Amendment adjudication.  See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1987-88 (explaining preference 
for categorical methodology under public rights theory).  Thus, if a challenged action has 
encroached on the First Amendment core of political speech, the defendant’s countervailing 
nonspeech interest should carry little weight.  My suggestions in the following discussion 
that the Court adapt balancing analyses to evaluate certain instances of nongovernmental 
censorship reflect both the practical utility of adopting existing tests and a high degree of 
caution in making sweeping changes to existing doctrine.
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policy decisions are highest.338  Given that value, and this article’s 
analysis of the public-private distinction in constitutional law, the First 
Amendment should provide substantial protection against 
nongovernmental censorship or suppression of political debate in times of 
war and national emergency.  As discussed in detail above, 
nongovernmental action against many and varied challenges to 
government policies and conventional wisdom has undermined political 
debate since the September 11 terrorist attacks.  This section sets forth 
the specific implications of extending the First Amendment to the three 
categories of nongovernmental action catalogued in that discussion: 
exclusions of political speakers from privately owned public spaces, 
reprisals against political expression, and suppression of information by 
the news media.
1. Exclusions of Political Speakers from Privately Owned 
Public Spaces
Political speakers who find themselves barred in times of war and 
national emergency from property generally open to the public should be 
able to secure First Amendment injunctions to enable their expression.339
A sensible analysis would resemble the familiar public forum doctrine, 
which applies to exclusions of speakers from government-owned spaces.  
Under that doctrine, the government generally may limit expressive 
activity on property that serves a function unrelated to expression, such as 
a prison or military base.340  In contrast, content-based limits on speech in 
spaces generally open to expressive activity, such as public sidewalks and 
government buildings available for public use, are subject to strict 
scrutiny.341  More deferential scrutiny applies to content-neutral limits on 
expression, including regulations of conduct that incidentally affect 
speech342 and regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression.343
Finally, where the government has opened its property to expressive 
activity for a limited purpose, it enjoys substantial latitude to proscribe 
338 See supra section I.A.2.
339 See supra section I.B.2.
340 See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass convictions of 
students who occupied county jail); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding 
regulations that restricted political activity on army base).
341 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down under Free Speech 
Clause state university’s denial to religious student group of right to use generally available 
meeting space).
342 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment 
challenge to federal ban on burning draft cards).
343 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
(rejecting First Amendment challenge, brought by activists who sought to dramatize plight 
of homeless, to federal ban on sleeping in certain public parks). 
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speech outside the forum’s purpose, but it must forego content-based 
regulation of speech that serves that purpose.344  Courts could easily adapt 
the public forum doctrine to nongovernmental exclusions of expressive 
activity.345  Such an analysis would respect property interests that are 
genuinely incompatible with expressive activity: a company would not 
have to allow a protest march through its offices.  At the same time, the 
analysis would facilitate expressive activity that uses property generally 
open to the public.
An analysis derived from the public forum doctrine would have 
altered the results of two important Vietnam-era cases with striking 
similarities to present circumstances.  In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,346 the 
Court rejected a First Amendment challenge by antiwar protesters 
threatened with arrest for leafleting in an urban shopping mall.  Justice 
Powell, writing for the majority, had to confront the Court’s decision four 
years earlier in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, Inc.347 that a suburban shopping center could not bar union 
organizers from picketing on shopping center property.  Justice 
Marshall’s majority opinion in Logan Valley had emphasized that a 
shopping center served the functions of a municipal business district and 
was open to the public for commercial activity.348  His opinion had relied 
on a vision of expressive freedom consistent with the public rights theory:
The large-scale movement of this country’s 
population from the cities to the suburbs has been 
accompanied by the advent of the suburban shopping 
center. . . .  Business enterprises located in downtown 
areas would be subject to on-the-spot public criticism for 
their [controversial] practices, but businesses situated in 
the suburbs could largely immunize themselves from 
similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking 
lots around their stores.  Neither precedent nor policy 
compels a result so at variance with the goal of free 
344 This somewhat elusive “limited purpose” doctrine provides the clearest explanation 
for the result in U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 
(1981), in which the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Postal Service’s 
restriction on depositing unstamped mail in home letter boxes, reasoning that letter boxes 
were openly available only for the deposit of paid mail.
345 By utilizing the public forum doctrine as the most readily available device for 
curbing nongovernmental denials of access to speakers, I do not mean to dismiss cogent 
objections that the doctrine is an unduly formalistic analytic tool that overshadows conflicts 
between competing principles in First Amendment cases.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John 
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First 
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1984) (contending that public forum 
analysis “distracts attention from the first amendment values at stake in a given case”). 
346 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
347 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
348 See id. at 320-21 (discussing government’s various prerogatives for limiting speech 
on public property and stating that private property owners’ rights “are at the very least co-
extensive with the powers possessed by States and municipalities”).
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expression and communication that is the heart of the 
First Amendment.349
The Lloyd Corp. opinion limited Logan Valley to its facts.   The majority 
insisted that “property [does not] lose its private character merely because 
the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.”350   A 
First Amendment right to protest in privately owned business districts 
would constitute a “doctrine of dedication of private property to public 
use.”351  Justice Powell saw no conflict between expressive freedom and 
this aggressive defense of property interests.352  He offered nothing to 
refute the First Amendment theory at the heart of Logan Valley.353
Under the analysis of this article, the Court probably decided Logan 
Valley correctly and certainly erred in the wartime context of Lloyd Corp.
As Justice Marshall recognized in Logan Valley, a shopping center is a 
space designed to foster public interaction and communication.  Although 
shopping centers exist for commercial purposes, the variety and number 
of interactions they promote gives rise to an expectation that all manner 
of communications will occur.  Because shopping centers and malls 
crowd out the public streets and sidewalks that once served as centers of 
interpersonal engagement, allowing their owners to proscribe political 
speech would drastically limit expressive freedom.  Where self-governing 
people confront the question whether to start or continue a war, such a 
limitation severely undermines the public interest.  Accordingly, Stephen 
Downs should have been able to wear his antiwar t-shirt around the 
Crossgates Mall354 secure in the First Amendment’s protection.  Political 
protestors should be free to speak in the concourses of shopping malls 
349 Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
350 Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569.
351 Id.
352 See id. at 570:
The Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these 
fundamental rights of a free society are [sic] incompatible with each 
other.  There may be situations where accommodations between them, 
and the drawing of lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy.  
But on the facts presented in this case, the answer is clear.
353 The Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), abandoned the pretense of 
accommodation in Lloyd Corp. and overruled Logan Valley altogether.  See Hudgens, 424 
U.S. at 520-21.  The Court’s method of dispensing with Logan Valley did little credit to any 
of the principals.  Justice Marshall, author of Logan Valley, insisted at length in his Lloyd 
Corp. dissent that the two cases could not be distinguished, see Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 
577-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting), then declared in dissent in Hudgens that they could be.  
See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Powell, after maintaining 
in his Lloyd Corp. majority opinion that the case was indistinguishable from Logan Valley,
conveniently conceded error in his Hudgens concurrence.  See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 523-24 
& n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Stewart, having joined Justice Marshall’s majority in 
Logan Valley and dissent in Lloyd Corp., had to deliver the majority opinion in Hudgens, a 
role for which he all but apologized.  See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518.
354 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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and should have recourse to the courts if mall owners try to stop them.  
Mall owners, consistent with the public forum doctrine, should have some 
latitude to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression.  They 
should not, however, have authority to sever their lucrative commerce 
with the public from the political discourse that naturally accompanies 
that commerce.
In a second Vietnam-era case, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee,355 an antiwar group and the DNC brought a First Amendment 
challenge against broadcasters’ refusal to sell advertising time for 
political messages.  As in the shopping center cases, the challengers 
contended that the Constitution compelled private property owners to 
allow political speakers access to property the owners had opened to 
expressive activity.  As in Lloyd Corp., the Court rebuffed the challenge, 
with a plurality concluding that the First Amendment created no general 
right of access to the mass media.  Chief Justice Burger’s opinion 
characterized the broadcasters’ policy against running editorial messages 
as “expressly based on a journalistic judgment that 10- to 60-second spot 
announcements are ill-suited to intelligible and intelligent treatment of 
public issues.”356  He acknowledged the public trust of broadcast 
licensees but concluded that Congress had given licensees primary 
responsibility for determining how to effectuate that trust.357  He 
subordinated the challengers’ First Amendment claim to the broadcasters’ 
autonomy interest:
[I]t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of 
promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, 
that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees 
are subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents.  
To do so in the name of the First Amendment would be a 
contradiction.358
Justice Brennan, dissenting, raised traditional state action arguments 
against the plurality’s analysis.  Broadcasters, he pointed out, require a 
publicly owned resource – the airwaves – in order to do business.359  They 
depend on the government for their right to use that resource, and the 
government subjects them to extensive regulatory control.360
This article’s analysis of the First Amendment and the public-private 
distinction precludes the plurality’s reasoning and result in CBS v. DNC.
When the nation is wrestling with questions of war and peace, the First 
Amendment cannot countenance broadcast licensees’ active efforts to 
prevent political views from circulating.  The plurality’s analysis of 
355 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
356 Id. at 118 (plurality opinion).
357 See id. at 117.
358 Id. at 120-21.
359 See id. at 173-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
360 See id. at 175-78.
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broadcasters’ editorial discretion is correct but beside the point.  The 
media’s editorial discretion properly enjoys formidable First Amendment 
protection,361 but it does not suffer when a broadcaster has made 
advertising time available and someone with a political message seeks to 
purchase it.362  As in the shopping center cases, the Justices who 
advocated public access gave the game away by playing on the field of 
conventional state action reasoning.  Whether or not national 
broadcasters’ privileges as licensees should mark them formally as “state 
actors,” they control which political ideas reach massive numbers of 
people.  Broadcasters’ refusals to accept advertising revenue from 
activists with varied viewpoints on the impending war with Iraq363 were 
the costly legacy of CBS v. DNC.  Under a better understanding of the 
First Amendment, those activists, rebuffed by CNN or CBS, should have 
had no trouble securing injunctions to compel acceptance of their political 
messages on the same terms as other paid advertisements.  Broadcasters 
are free to determine how much advertising time they sell and what they 
charge for it, but they should not have latitude to engineer a content-
based exclusion of political expression.
Some might object that a constitutional allowance for political 
speakers to use nongovernmental property would violate the First 
Amendment rights of property owners to be free from “compelled 
speech” because it would force the owners to present messages with 
which they disagreed.364  The argument has both practical and theoretical 
deficiencies.  On a practical level, most people neither know nor care who 
owns their favorite shopping center or television station.  The idea that 
shoppers or viewers would ascribe to those unknown owners any 
protestor’s political message, let alone the multiplicity of competing and 
contradictory messages that a constitutional allowance for public access 
would produce, defies imagination.  On the level of the public rights 
theory, the public’s interest in information and open debate dwarfs 
property owners’ autonomy interests, including their interest in avoiding 
association with ideas they disdain.365  Another potential objection is that, 
assuming the Court incorrectly decided Lloyd Corp. and CBS v. DNC, it 
361 See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text
362 This was the interest that troubled the Court in CBS v. DNC. See 412 U.S. at 124 
(declining to require broadcasters to accept political advertising because such a requirement 
would cause “a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage 
of public issues”).
363 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
364 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down on compelled 
speech grounds New Hampshire requirement that motorists display “Live Free or Die” 
slogan on license plates).
365 See Magarian, supra note 9, at 1982 (discussing public rights theory’s elevation of 
collective informational interests over individual autonomy interests).
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could correct those errors simply by holding mall owners and 
broadcasters to be state actors.  That approach, in my view, would 
underscore the shallow formalism of the state action doctrine while 
ignoring the important reason for overturning the precedents: the 
necessity, in a healthy democratic system, of robust political discourse.
2.  Reprisals Against Political Expression
The public rights theory dictates that, as in cases where property 
owners exclude political speakers from areas generally open to the public, 
courts should invoke the First Amendment to enjoin reprisals by private 
authorities against individuals’ expression of their political views.366
Courts should not allow majoritarian pique, which may reflect covert or 
implicit government pressure, to justify institutional retaliation against 
socially beneficial speech.  Actions that properly subject individuals to 
reprisals, such as failures to perform job duties, may in some cases 
involve political expression.  Institutional retaliation aimed at the 
political content of speech, however, is rarely if ever justified.  
Nongovernmental institutions’ participation in political debates may often 
enrich the public’s understanding of important issues.  In contrast, courts 
should not tolerate those institutions’ leveraging their resources to silence 
public debate, any more than courts tolerate censorship by the 
government.  
Here, as in the context of access to property, a doctrine applied to 
date only against government defendants provides a blueprint for analysis 
of claims against nongovernmental authorities.  In Pickering v. Board of 
Education,367 the Court held that, although the public interest in efficient 
services empowers the government to place greater constraints on 
employees’ speech than it may place on citizens generally, it must 
exercise substantial restraint in disciplining employees for speaking about 
“matters of public concern.”368  A public employer may justify a 
restriction on such speech only by showing that the “necessary impact on 
the [employer’s] actual operation” outweighs the employer’s expressive 
interest.369  Most Pickering cases involve employees’ criticisms of their 
employers, and the Court occasionally has upheld employers’ retaliation 
against such criticism.370  In contrast, the Court has shown little tolerance 
366 See supra section I.B.3.
367 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
368 Id. at 568.
369 Id. at 571.
370 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (upholding employee’s discharge for 
complaining about internal office policy); but see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) 
(vacating summary judgment in favor of employer and supervisor who fired employee for 
criticizing her department); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (affirming decision 
that professor who had criticized college president and regents was entitled to pursue 
lawsuit for wrongful termination).  The force of the Pickering doctrine’s protection even for 
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for reprisals against employees’ broader political statements, even 
applying Pickering to reverse the firing of a clerk who expressed hope 
that someone would assassinate the President.371  From the standpoint of 
the public rights theory, the Pickering standard has the virtue of 
incorporating the distinction between speech on matters of general and 
individual interest.372  The Court in applying Pickering has emphasized 
the informational interests of audiences as well as the autonomy interests 
of speakers.373
Subjecting nongovernmental employers to a Pickering-type analysis 
would have given Dan Guthrie and Tom Gutting, the newspaper 
columnists fired for their criticisms of President Bush’s behavior after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks,374 strong grounds for First Amendment 
challenges to their dismissals.  Guthrie’s and Gutting’s accusations of 
presidential cowardice in the face of crisis boldly challenged official 
conduct and popular sentiment on a matter of the most serious national 
concern.  Their employers, in arguing for the functional necessity of 
firing the columnists, probably would have maintained that the firings 
were essential to prevent angry readers from canceling their 
subscriptions.  This argument would have presented problems of both fact 
and principle.  On a practical level, the newspapers would have needed to 
substantiate claims of potential losses in readership, and the fact that 
Grants Pass, Ore. and Texas City, Tex. are not centers of media 
competition would have complicated that effort.  As a matter of principle, 
the First Amendment precludes even weighty arguments for the 
instrumental necessity of chilling or punishing speech.375  The newspaper 
owners’ angry published responses to their columnists, besides probably 
placating most offended readers, reflected the positive instinct to rebut 
employees who directly criticize their employers becomes apparent through a contrast with 
similar cases involving nongovernmental employers, in which lower courts have 
consistently refused to find First Amendment violations.  See Robert F. Ladenson, Free 
Speech in the Workplace and the Public-Private Distinction, 7 LAW & PHIL. 247, 252 & n.22 
(1989) (cataloguing decisions).
371 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).  The Pickering doctrine, like any 
legal constraint on employers’ reasons for taking job-related actions, has relevance 
primarily for dismissals or disciplinary actions against existing employees, although a 
Pickering-based claim for failure to hire a job applicant based on her speech would 
presumably be possible given sufficient evidence.
372 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (holding that Pickering test does not apply when 
employees speak “upon matters only of personal interest”).
373 See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 
(1995) (considering “the interests of both potential audiences and . . . present and future 
employees” in employees’ ability to accept honoraria for speaking).
374 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
375 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (rejecting interests offered in 
support of criminal prosecution for burning of American flag).
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arguments, rather than censor them.376  The firings, unfortunately, recast 
the owners’ reasoned responses as mere adjuncts to their superior 
economic power.  Extension of the Pickering analysis to 
nongovernmental workplaces would largely preclude employer retaliation 
as a weapon against political dissenters.377
A roughly similar analysis could apply in retaliation cases outside the 
employment context.  For example, in considering a legal challenge to the 
major stock exchanges’ bar against Al Jazeera journalists because of their 
colleagues’ reporting on the Iraq war,378 a court could have inquired 
whether the importance of the ban to the exchanges’ operation 
outweighed the public’s interest in multifaceted news reporting.379  The 
exchanges would have brought even less to that balance than the 
newspapers that fired Guthrie and Gutting.  The idea that anyone would 
have criticized the exchanges, let alone stopped dealing with them, had 
they not gone out of their way to suspend Al Jazeera’s floor privileges is 
inconceivable.  On the other hand, the images of dead and imprisoned 
American soldiers whose broadcast prompted the suspensions had 
tremendous potential to influence debates about the wisdom of the Iraq 
war.  The exchanges appear to have used their institutional might to chill 
such reporting, and accordingly to diminish public debate, out of nothing 
more than offended sensibilities.  As in the newspaper firing cases, the 
exchanges might have done the public a service by standing up for their 
sensibilities and criticizing Al Jazeera’s journalistic standards.  In 
contrast, their choices to cut their opponent off at the knees offended First 
Amendment values in a way that a democratic society at war cannot 
afford.
376 Had the newspapers chosen not to publish the offending columns, rather than 
punish the authors, courts would have had to defer to their editorial discretion.  Reprisals 
against columnists for the content of their articles transcends that discretion.  I propose an 
indirect approach for dealing with news media misinformation and suppression of 
information infra section III.B.3.
377 For an argument that legislatures should constrain nongovernmental employers’ 
retaliation against employees’ speech but the First Amendment should not, see Ladenson, 
supra note 368, at 256-61.  Ladenson’s opposition to constitutionalizing the problem stems 
from his premises that the First Amendment serves primarily to check any institution with 
“sufficient power to control thought over an entire society” and that only the government 
has such power.  Id. at 257.  The first premise, in my view, sets too high a standard for First 
Amendment concern, and the second underestimates nongovernmental institutions’ 
capacity to curb expressive freedom.
378 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
379 Although the banned journalists presumably were not American citizens, the public 
rights theory’s emphasis on the public’s interest in information dictates that courts extend 
full First Amendment protection to noncitizen speakers who address matters of public 
importance.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 118-19.  The al-Jazeera episode does not 
implicate the interesting question whether the daily workings of stock exchanges are 
matters of public importance, because the concern in retaliation cases is that a restriction 
will chill a speaker’s expression, and al-Jazeera expresses many views on political matters.  
Finally, the Internet and satellite television render immaterial the fact that al-Jazeera’s 
primary audience is outside the United States. 
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3.  Misinformation and Suppression of Information by 
News Media
The public rights theory of expressive freedom requires strong First 
Amendment protection of the news media, because they make an essential 
contribution to democratic discourse by gathering information and 
disseminating it to the public.380  Accordingly, my proposal to enforce 
First Amendment standards against nongovernmental actors must address 
news organizations’ failures to report information salient to policy 
disputes.381   At the same time, the news media present an especially 
thorny problem for that proposal.  As the Supreme Court has often noted, 
the media’s informational functions involve the constant exercise of 
subjective editorial discretion.382  Editors and producers must constantly 
determine which stories are newsworthy, what information is sufficiently 
reliable, and how to allocate limited publishing resources among different 
stories.  Any governmental interference with those decisions, including 
judicial interference, threatens to undermine values central to the First 
Amendment.  To say that a judge, in appropriate circumstances, may tell 
a property owner what activities it must tolerate or bar an employer from 
certain retaliatory actions is one thing.  To say that she may tell an editor 
which stories to run or not to run is something else entirely.  For the same
reason, media entities, unlike nongovernmental institutions generally, 
should be able to raise First Amendment claims.383
Even so, the same sorts of pressures that may motivate a mall owner 
to exclude protestors or an employer to fire a political dissenter can lead 
to situations like news organizations’ voluntary submission to restrictive 
380 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing news media’s public 
trust). 
381 See supra section I.B.1. (discussing media failures since 2001 terrorist attacks).
382 See Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 
(1998) (recognizing the TV broadcasters have “widest journalistic freedom”); Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that publisher’s treatment of 
public issues falls within its proper editorial control); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973) (plurality opinion) (recognizing necessity of substantial 
journalistic discretion for broadcasters).
383 Although my discussion focuses on the news media, the entertainment media play a 
complementary role in fostering political discourse, a role undermined by consolidation of 
media ownership.  See, e.g., Brent Staples, “The Trouble With Corporate Radio: The Day the 
Protest Music Died,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, p. A30 (positing connection between 
consolidation of radio station ownership and absence from airwaves of politically 
provocative music); see also supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (discussing 
censorship by entertainment corporations since September 11 terrorist attacks).  Like the 
news media, the entertainment media require editorial freedom to perform their democratic 
function; thus, the approach proposed here for First Amendment oversight of news media 
ownership rules also encompasses the entertainment media.
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rules for battlefield reporting in Iraq384 and their parroting of the 
government’s dubious assertions about the extent of the Iraqi military 
threat.385  The influence of owners and advertisers can make the media, in 
Ed Baker’s sadly apt description, “too timid in exposing corruption and 
abuse both of public and especially of private power, insufficiently 
diverse in its presentations, relatively unresponsive to significant 
elements of society and more encouraging of political passivity than 
public involvement.”386  Media corporations in the United States may be 
more subject to intimidation by overt or subtle governmental influence 
than are state-owned media such as the BBC, because their “private” 
status leaves them vulnerable to regulatory rewards and punishments 
while preventing the sort of public accountability that state-owned media 
must face.387  Pressure on the media intensifies during wartime, when the 
government can manipulate media behavior through selective access to 
battlefields and strategists and when the public, at least initially, demands 
a patriotic informational environment.388  Media capitulation to such 
pressures exacts far greater First Amendment costs than suppression of 
debate in the private property or reprisal cases, because the media plays a 
central role in informing the public and fostering political dialogue.
Even though courts should not interfere in editorial decisions, they 
can encourage unfettered newsgathering and reporting by scrutinizing 
institutional arrangements that inhibit media competition.389  The present 
climate of limited regulation has allowed a few corporations to acquire a 
large percentage of key American media outlets.  In broadcasting, the five 
largest media companies – News Corp., Viacom, Disney, General 
384 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
386 C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMM. 
421, 426 (1993); see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 60 (contending that “the 
preponderance of [corporate journalism] would be compatible with an authoritarian political 
regime”).
387 Paul Krugman, The China Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, p. A31.   Krugman 
contends that the primary threat to media independence arises not from direct government 
censorship but from “a system in which the major media companies have strong incentives 
to present the news in a way that pleases the party in power, and no incentive not to.”  Id.
388 According to CBS anchor Dan Rather, discussing coverage of the Iraq war, 
diminished journalistic independence results from “fear among journalists – fear that if we 
don’t dumb it down, sleaze it up, tart it up, that some competitor will beat us in circulation 
and ratings.”   Did We See the Real War?, supra note 106, at 44.  Harvard media analyst 
Marvin Kalb concurred: “There may be serious economic consequences for American 
broadcast-news outlets that are inadequately patriotic in appearance.”  Id. at 43.  Time’s 
James Poniewozik, also reflecting on the Iraq war, put the point more bluntly: “Patriotism 
pays.  So Fox and NBC dueled over who was the greater quisling.”  Poniewozik, supra note 
118, at 71.
389 See Baker, supra note 384, at 431 (contending that “concern with [media] ownership 
discretion is intensified because the structure of the media market routinely places the 
interest in profits in tension with journalistic professionalism and democratic service”); 
Netanel, Mass Media, supra note 93, at 338 (advocating, to ensure that media serves 
democratic interests, “partial solutions, most involving efforts to balance one power center 
against one or more others”).
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Electric, and AOL Time-Warner – own stations that account for 70 
percent of the nation’s prime time television viewership.390  Six cable 
television companies boast 80 percent of cable subscribers.391  Clear 
Channel, the largest U.S. radio corporation, owns stations that draw 25 
percent of all listeners.392  Media consolidation has even affected the 
notoriously heterogeneous Internet: 16 large companies own the top 20 
news sites on the World Wide Web, but the top five receive more traffic 
than the next 15 combined.393 Large media corporations’ influence over 
the agencies that regulate the media business394 makes judicial oversight 
in this area essential.
Concentration of ownership of major media outlets reduces the 
diversity and originality of information the media presents.  The massive 
consolidation of the radio industry prompted by the 1996 
Telecommunications Act395 has led to a reduction in radio newsgathering 
operations, with many local reporting staffs gutted.396  Conversely, 
diffusion of ownership facilitates a vigorous and inclusive exchange of 
information and ideas and ensures that the media present diverse 
information and varied perspectives.397  Although government regulation 
to prevent concentration of media ownership arguably offends a private 
rights vision of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has long held 
390 See Jeff Gelles, FCC Quiet on Media-Ownership Vote, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 11, 
2003, p. E1; David D. Kirkpatrick, From Some Boardrooms, Nostalgia for Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2003, p. C9 (hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Boardrooms).
391 Kirkpatrick, Boardrooms, supra note 388, at C9.
392 Id.  Clear Channel owns over 1,200 radio stations, 37 television stations, and more 
than 775,000 billboards and is also the world’s largest concert producer.  Andrew Ratner, 
War Coverage Could Alter U.S. Media Policy, BALT. SUN, Mar. 30, 2003, p. 1D.
393 Matthew Hindman & Kenneth Neil Cukier, More News, Less Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2003, p. A17.  Despite the Internet’s decentralized technology, established media 
titans enjoy advantages in cyberspace, because they can adapt existing content and 
advertising relationships to the new medium.  See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, 
at 77-78 (discussing reasons for corporate primacy on Internet).
394 A recent report by the Center for Public Integrity found that, during the past eight 
years, broadcast and telecommunications interests provided the primary financial backing 
for 2,500 trips, costing $2.8 million, by FCC commissioners and employees.  Bob Herbert, 
Cozy With the F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, p. A35.  The Center also reported that, 
during their consideration of the new regulations, FCC officials met more than 70 times 
with media industry representatives, compared to five meetings with consumer advocates.  
Id.; see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 78-79 (documenting influence of 
corporate media lobbyists).
395 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
396 See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 94, at 53.  Prior to the 1996 deregulation, 
no single entity could own more than 28 stations nationwide; today, Clear Channel owns 
1,200 stations.  Id.
397 See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: 
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999); Baker, supra note 384; Jerome A. 
Barron, Structural Regulation of the Media and the Diversity Rationale, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 
555 (2002).
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that ownership controls advance important First Amendment values.398
Ownership regulations, while not sufficient in an era of unprecedented 
technological change to guarantee robust democratic discourse, remain 
necessary for that goal.399  The market alone will not produce a 
competitive, diverse media environment.400  Accordingly, federal courts 
should emphasize First Amendment interests when evaluating 
government regulations that affect the distribution of media ownership.
     Some commentators have argued that substantial concentration of 
media ownership benefits democracy by ensuring that media entities are 
large and powerful enough to function as forceful counterweights to 
government.  In articulating the idea of a First Amendment defined by the 
institutional media’s role in checking government misconduct, Vincent 
Blasi asserts “the need for well-organized, well-financed, professional 
critics to serve as a counterforce to government.”401  The argument is one 
of degree, and my proposal certainly does not contemplate a media 
environment bereft of large entities.  Institutional media have undeniable 
value for democracy because of their distinct perspective and their 
newsgathering resources.  In part, however, the argument that media 
concentration serves democracy reflects uncritical adherence to the 
traditional public-private distinction.402  As I have contended, government 
requires checking not because it is “public” but because it is powerful.  
Large, powerful corporations are not natural enemies of government.  
They may share government’s interests in many aspects of the status quo, 
398 See FCC v. National Citizens’ Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798-802 (1978) 
(upholding against First Amendment challenge FCC rules barring cross-ownership of 
newspaper and broadcast station in same market).
399 A complementary path to facilitating democratic discourse, advocated most 
vigorously by Yochai Benkler, lies in encouraging the development of decentralized forms of 
mass communication on the model of the Internet.  See Yochai Benkler, A Speakers’ Corner 
Under the Sun, in ELKIN-KOREN & NETANEL, supra note 93, at 291, 305-14 (positing 
superiority of an informational commons model in terms of democratic discourse and 
personal autonomy); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper 
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 561, 568 (2000) (arguing for a regulatory structure designed to ensure “[a]n open, free, 
flat, peer-to-peer network”).
400 See Baker, supra note 384, at 426-31 (using economic analysis to refute argument 
that market produces what media consumers value or need).  Even the Internet has 
produced only limited diversity in the information most people receive.  See Matthew 
Hindman & Cukier, supra note 391, at A17 (summarizing findings that very small number 
of Web sites receive vast majority of traffic because of “winner take all” effect of search 
engines and hyperlinks).
401 Blasi, supra note 93, at 541; see also Neil W. Netanel, Taking Stock: The Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1885 (2000) (arguing that 
“some degree of hierarchy, some concentration of expressive power in media enterprises, is 
the price we must pay if the press is to be able to fulfill its vital watchdog and agenda-
setting roles”) (hereinafter Netanel, Taking Stock).
402 Blasi vigorously defends the public-private distinction.  See Blasi, supra note 93, at 
538-41.  In contrast, Netanel joins his nuanced defense of institutional media to an 
acknowledgement that they “serve as an important check on both government and private 
entity malfeasance.”  Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1923.
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and the two sorts of institutions may coopt one another in many 
circumstances.  In addition, arguments for concentrated media power may 
reflect the fallacy, debunked by ontological critics of the public-private 
distinction,403 that a climate dominated by large corporations reflects 
absence of government control.404  Without doubt a healthy democracy 
requires a media environment with both large and small components,405
but that need reflects the importance of diversity and competition more 
than the importance of concentrated “private” power.  In any event, 
judicial review of congressional policy on media ownership could curb 
decentralization that undermined political debate as surely as it could 
curb centralization.
The ongoing controversy over recent FCC regulations that would ease 
restrictions on ownership of multiple media outlets exemplifies the 
opportunity for indirect First Amendment oversight of the news media.  
In June 2003 the FCC voted 3-2 to ease restrictions on cross-ownership 
within a single media market of newspapers and broadcast stations; to 
allow a single company to own up to three television stations in the 
largest media markets; and to allow a single television network to own 
stations that effectively reach up to 90 percent of the national audience.406
Advocates and opponents alike agreed that the new rules would spur 
further concentration of media ownership.407 An ideologically diverse 
coalition of political, religious, and consumer organizations opposed the 
FCC’s action, charging that the new rules would produce a greater 
uniformity of viewpoints on the airwaves.408  Even some media 
executives decried the FCC’s deregulatory fervor as damaging to media 
403 See supra section II.B.1. and accompanying text.
404 See Blasi, supra note 93, at 542 (warning, in course of argument supportive of large 
institutional media, of dangers “if modern government were ever to gain complete control of 
the channels of mass communication”); Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1885 
(asserting that “liberal democracy requires media enterprises that are independent from 
state support”).
405 See Netanel, Taking Stock, supra note 399, at 1886 (advocating media policy that 
balances need for diverse perspectives with need for powerful institutional media).  Netanel 
ultimately advocates a government media policy that includes “cross-ownership and 
consolidation restrictions, subsidizing non-commercial media outlets, and other measures 
designed to support a multiplicity of expressive sources.”  Id. at 1925.
406 See Stephen Labaton,  F.C.C. Votes to Relax Rules Limiting Media Ownership, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2003, p. A1, C9.  The regulations expressly allow a network to own stations 
that reach 45% of the national audience – up from the previous rule’s 35% – but the 
commission retained a formula that excludes UHF viewers from the calculation, making the 
actual limit much higher. 
407 See David D. Kirkpatrick, New Rules Give Big Media Chance to Get Even Bigger,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, p. C1 (hereinafter Kirkpatrick, New Rules).
408 See id. at C9 (identifying coalition of opponents as including National Rifle 
Association, National Organization for Women, Common Cause, United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Writers Guild of America, and 
Parents Television Council).
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diversity.409  Perhaps most significant, although little noted in the United 
States, was the criticism by a leading international rights monitor.  On the 
eve of the FCC’s vote, Freimut Duve, representative for media freedom 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, warned that 
the new regulations “may affect the pluralism of opinion that 
characterizes the media scene in the U.S.”410  Calling the U.S. “the most 
symbolically important country for the culture of press freedom,” Duve 
expressed particular concern with the negative example the regulations’ 
constriction of opinion might set “for other OSCE-participating states 
where democratic counterbalances to authoritarian rule, including free 
media, are still weak.”411
A federal appellate court already has issued a preliminary injunction 
against the new rules.412  The Senate has voted to repeal them, but the 
House may not follow suit, and President Bush has promised to defend 
the rules with his veto pen.413 Should Congress fail to block the 
regulations, this article’s First Amendment analysis provides a solid First 
Amendment ground on which a federal court could do so.  Under the 
public rights theory, a court could sustain a First Amendment challenge to 
the FCC rules based on a showing that their promotion of media 
concentration undermined the media’s facilitation of informed political 
debate.  Such an injunction would cure a governmental effort to 
undermine First Amendment interests.  Focusing on assertive oversight of 
media regulations would allow courts to enforce First Amendment values 
without undermining those same values by imposing substantive 
judgments on particular editorial decisions.  Judicial intervention against 
concentration of media ownership would not have directly improved 
major media outlets’ lackluster performance before, during, and after the 
Iraq war.  But consistent judicial pressure on Congress to promote a 
diverse, independent media should encourage vigorous newsgathering 
and reporting in good times and, more importantly, in bad.
C.Why the Court?
Aside from the substantive novelty of extending the First Amendment 
to prevent nongovernmental institutions from censoring political debate, 
such a doctrinal shift would require federal courts to make numerous 
difficult judgments.  Courts would have to determine whether a 
409 See Kirkpatrick, New Rules, supra note 405, at C9 (discussing opposition of Ted 
Turner and Barry Diller to new FCC regulations).
410 Marcus Kabel, Rights Monitor Critical of U.S. Media Ownership, IRISH TIMES, May 
30, 2003, p. 11.
411 Id.
412 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 18390 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 
2003).
413 See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2003, p. A1.
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challenged action seriously undermined political debate; if it did, whether 
the First Amendment nonetheless gave the defendant some basis to claim 
sanctuary from judicial oversight; and, if no such basis existed, what sort 
of First Amendment test should control the case.  In addition, courts 
would have to determine when institutions’ instrumental contributions to 
fostering political debate entitled them to advance First Amendment 
claims against constraints on their own actions.  Those inquiries would 
require complex, multifaceted analyses, and our legal culture tends to 
resist expansion of the judicial role on grounds of both institutional 
competence and the separation of powers.414  Consideration of available 
alternatives, however, leaves little room to doubt that when 
nongovernmental institutions pose a serious threat to political debate, 
only federal courts stand in a strong position to stop them.
One alternative to the sort of judicial review I propose would be to 
give Congress primary responsibility for ensuring that nongovernmental 
institutions respect First Amendment norms.  Notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s recent protectiveness of its authority to interpret 
constitutional provisions,415 Congress as well as courts can safeguard 
constitutional values.416  Indeed, recognition of nongovernmental threats 
to individual rights sometimes leads courts to ease constitutional 
constraints on state action in order to allow legislatures to solve the 
problem.417  Statutes have normative and practical advantages over the 
judicial process because Congress is a politically accountable institution 
with the mandate and resources to make difficult policy decisions.418
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress appropriately 
may safeguard expressive interests the First Amendment does not ensure.  
414 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (advocating alternative 
means of vindicating constitutional values where institutional concerns counsel against 
judicial enforcement). 
415 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act on ground that only Court had proper authority to define 
constitutional constraints on states).
416 See Chemerinsky, Rethinking, supra note 194, at 507 (noting that state and federal 
statutes and state common law can protect against nongovernmental infringements on 
rights); Eule & Varat, supra note 205, at 1580-1600 (discussing statutory efforts to hold 
nongovernmental actors to First Amendment norms).
417 See Baker, supra note 384, at 422-23 (explaining that “the societal need to rein in 
private power” may incline courts “toward restricting or sculpting constitutional protections 
of private power in order to leave that power subject to legislative control”); Strauss, 
Persuasion, supra note 329, at 368-70 (discussing circumstances under which easing of 
constitutional constraints on government regulation of speech might be justified).
418 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) 
(advancing classic argument that majoritarian decisionmaking is preferable to lawmaking 
by unelected judges).
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In CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,419 the Court upheld 
an FCC order that broadcast television networks sell extensive time to the 
Carter presidential campaign, pursuant to a federal statute that mandated 
“reasonable access” to the airwaves for federal political candidates.420
Although the Court in an earlier case had held that the First Amendment 
did not require broadcasters to sell advertising space for political 
messages,421 the majority in CBS v. FCC concluded that Congress 
properly had created an affirmative right of access to the airwaves for 
political candidates.422  In some circumstances, as the public rights theory 
of expressive freedom recognizes, Congress should and does protect 
expressive freedom.
In the context of wartime dissent, however, reliance on congressional 
action is dangerous, because Congress in wartime is likely to welcome 
the efforts of nongovernmental censors.  Nongovernmental suppression of 
wartime dissent usually reflects genuine or calculated sympathy with 
government policies; thus, even when the government itself is not the 
censor, suppression of dissent tends to serve government interests.423
Expecting the government to restrict actions that both serve its own 
interests and relieve it of the political costs of curbing speech is 
unrealistic.  Even if Congress enacted forceful statutory restrictions on 
nongovernmental censorship during times of national calm, enforcement 
of such restrictions during wartime would depend on the politically 
motivated decisions of Executive Branch officials.  If some institution 
within government must guard against rights violations that advance 
government policies, the principle of representation-reinforcing judicial 
review424 indicates that the judiciary is the best candidate.
Another possible method of protecting expression against private 
censorship would be for courts to create a common law tort, or a set of 
torts, for censorship of speech.425  This would create a similar structure to 
the law’s protection of privacy interests, which has separate constitutional 
and common law tort schemes.426  A tort approach to protection of 
419 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
420 See 42 U.S.C. sec. 312 (a) (7).
421 See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).  For a discussion 
of CBS v. DNC, see supra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
422 See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 379 (holding that Congress had “created a right of 
access that enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees”).
423 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
424 See United States v. Carolene Products Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (defining 
limited circumstances in which Court properly may submit legislation to more searching 
review in order to ensure proper political representation); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980) (elaborating representation reinforcement theory).
425 For a proposal along these lines, see Rory Lancman, Protecting Speech From Private 
Abridgement: Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 S.W.U. L. REV. 223 (1996).
426 See generally RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 22-24 (2d ed. 2002) (describing origins of privacy rights in common law and 
constitutional contexts).
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expressive freedom, however, would contravene the public rights theory 
of expressive freedom by making speech protection against private parties 
a matter of individual initiative and interest rather than the common good.  
Legal protection of dissent would depend on the willingness of the 
aggrieved speaker to litigate and establish both liability and damages.  
Under the constitutional approach I propose, the entire political 
community shares the legal interest in unfettered receipt of ideas.427  In 
addition, reliance on state tort law to protect political debate would 
inappropriately consign a central national interest to fifty different locally 
determined and potentially inconsistent tort regimes. 
A more promising alternative method of safeguarding political debate 
against nongovernmental censorship would be reliance on state 
constitutional or statutory law.  In PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins,428 the Supreme Court upheld against First and Fifth Amendment 
challenges a California constitutional requirement that shopping center 
owners must permit expressive activities on their premises.  The Court 
rejected the argument that its denial in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner429 of a 
federal constitutional mandate of expressive access to shopping centers 
implied a federal constitutional bar on state mandates.430  Instead, the 
Court assessed the state rule de novo and deferred substantially to the 
state’s regulatory prerogatives in rejecting the federal constitutional 
challenges.431  State provisions of the sort upheld in PruneYard perform a 
valuable service in the absence of federal constitutional protection, but 
they fall far short of extending the First Amendment in the manner I have 
suggested.  First, the necessity for national protection of a nationally 
significant value should discourage reliance on state constitutions or 
statutes as much as on state common law.  Second, attempted state 
statutory solutions leave reviewing courts free to reimpose the public-
private distinction, at least in cases that arguably involve clashing 
expressive interests, by reference to the supposed state action requirement 
427 In this respect, as in many others, adoption of the public rights theory to adjudicate 
First Amendment disputes would require the Court to liberalize its cramped standing 
doctrine, starting with the denial of standing for so-called “generalized grievances.”  See, 
e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying 
standing to challenge reserve membership of Members of Congress on ground that asserted 
grievance was held in common by the general public).  Alternatively, the Court could 
preserve present standing requirements by treating aggrieved speakers as trustees for the 
public interest in access to information.  But even that approach to standing would differ 
from a tort regime, which would divert judicial attention from societal to personal injuries.
428 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
429 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
430 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 80-81.
431 See id. at 83-85 (rejecting Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and substantive due 
process challenges), 85-88 (rejecting First Amendment compelled speech challenge).
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of the First Amendment.432  Finally, California-style protections against 
nongovernmental censorship are rare and limited in scope,433 suggesting a 
level of political resistance that advocates of expressive freedom would 
struggle to overcome one state at a time.
The conclusion that the federal judiciary is best positioned to restrict 
nongovernmental censorship of wartime dissent would require the 
Supreme Court to identify a legal basis for injunctions against 
nongovernmental suppression of political debate.  United States Code 
Chapter 42, section 1983, which authorizes suits to enjoin violations of 
constitutional rights, applies only to state actors.434  The Court could clear 
this hurdle in a manner parallel to its approach in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Agents.435  In Bivens, the Court confronted the problem that no 
federal statute gave courts explicit authority to award damages against 
federal officials for constitutional violations.  The majority created a 
cause of action.  It concluded that, although “the Fourth Amendment does 
not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money 
damages,”436 such a remedy was appropriate because “[h]istorically, 
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of 
personal interests in liberty.”437  Just as the Court in Bivens decreed that a 
defendant’s federal character should not bar a remedy typically available 
for the sort of violation at issue, it could decree that the nongovernmental 
character of a defendant should not bar the availability of all relief for 
First Amendment violations.
Professors Alexander and Sunstein, both ontological critics of the 
public-private distinction, raise substantive objections to allowing 
constitutional injunctions against nongovernmental actors.438  Alexander 
maintains that because “all exercises of private power take place against a 
background of laws that are paradigmatic state action . . . any 
432 See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(rejecting free speech claim under Massachusetts statute because both parties in dispute 
presented expressive interests and “the . . . “right” to free speech . . . traditionally has 
content only in relation to state action”).  The First Circuit in Redgrave avoided directly 
subordinating the Massachusetts statute to the First Amendment by characterizing the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s responses to certified questions as having relied on 
the interpretive canon of constitutional doubt to establish a statutory defense based on 
competing expressive interests.  See id. at 910-11.
433 In fact, the California Supreme Court recently held that the state’s Constitution 
protects expressive freedom only against state action, reading PruneYard to depend on the 
“functional equivalence” of shopping centers with traditional public forums.  See Golden 
Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001) (rejecting state 
constitutional challenge to apartment building’s bar on leafleting).
434 See 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
435 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
436 Id. at 396.
437 Id. at 395.
438 Textual objections to the idea of injunctions against nongovernmental actions 
replicate the defects of the supposed textual basis for the public-private distinction.  See 
supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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constitutional challenge to the exercise of private power can and should 
be recharacterized as a constitutional challenge to those background 
laws.”439  Per Sunstein, “there should be enthusiastic agreement – for 
reasons of both text and principle – that . . . private conduct raises no 
constitutional question.”440  Their arguments appears to reflect a concern 
that allowing constitutionally based injunctions against private actors 
would destroy the boundary, essential to liberal democracy, between 
entities who possess rights and entities bound to honor rights.441
Reconceptualizing the constitutional public-private distinction as a 
personal integrity principle obviates that concern, however,442 and the 
public rights theory of expressive freedom provides a basis for 
distinguishing between entities the First Amendment protects and those it 
obligates.443  Insistence on a government defendant reflects the logic of 
the state action doctrine, under which the only basis for holding shopping 
mall owners constitutionally obligated to accommodate protestors is the 
formal claim that the owners’ property rights depend on privileges the 
government has accorded.  In contrast, the approach I have outlined 
allows a court to subject the mall’s owners to the First Amendment 
because their actions significantly undermine political discourse.  It 
avoids the contrivance of requiring people whose rights nongovernmental 
institutions abridge to cast about for some governmental action – perhaps 
a broad-based policy that only facilitates denials of rights in rare 
circumstances – to challenge.  Under present doctrine, even if mall 
protestors convinced a court that their exclusion by the mall’s owners was 
“state action,” they would need to vindicate their rights indirectly, 
perhaps by suing the local zoning board.444  That suit, however, would be 
impractical and misdirected, probably to the point of failing the Court’s 
present Article III standing tests for causation and redressability.445  We 
should not trap expressive freedom between a rock and a hard place.
439 Alexander, supra note 278, at 371-72.
440 Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 267.
441 See Alexander, supra note 278, at 368 (characterizing “the too hasty jump from bad 
private choices to shrinkage or eradication of the private sphere” as “the jump of every 
totalitarian”).
442 See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
443 See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
444 The likelihood that nongovernmental institutions may censor dissent because of 
actual or tacit governmental influence creates a basis under existing doctrine for treating 
such self-censorship as state action, which would obviate the novel justification for judicial 
intervention presented here.  See TRIBE, supra note 279, at 1715 (“[T]he more government 
gains (and the more it appears to gain) by the way in which a choice is made, the clearer is 
the case for treating the choice as one for which government bears responsibility.”).
445 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-61 (1984) (denying standing to challengers of 
federal tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools because challengers’ 
diminished opportunity to secure racially integrated education for their children was not 
traceable to challenged tax exemptions).
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CONCLUSION
The American ideal that sovereignty resides in the people means that 
the people must have access to ideas and opinions about matters of 
communal concern in order to ensure that our elected representatives 
make wise policy decisions.  Popular engagement in policymaking serves 
an especially weighty purpose in times of war and national emergency.  
Unfortunately, the potency of wartime governments tends to discourage 
political debate at exactly the moments when it is most valuable to 
society.  Courts have long applied the First Amendment to try to protect 
political debate from direct governmental interference, even in wartime.  
In contrast, nongovernmental suppression of wartime political debate has 
flourished.  Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, merchants who use their real 
and intangible property to do business with the public have excluded 
political speakers; employers and other powerful institutions have 
imposed punishments against people who have opposed government 
policies; and the news media have suppressed information necessary for 
an informed political debate about matters of war and peace.  That these 
assaults on essential public discourse have come from “private” rather 
than government sources should give us no comfort, because any assault 
on public discourse undermines democracy.
Our present constitutional understanding immunizes nongovernmental 
institutions from constitutional responsibilities by bestowing on them the 
title of “private actors.”  If we accept democratic self-determination as a 
core value of the Constitution, that understanding must change.  When we 
peel away the public-private distinction’s elaborate layers of formalism, 
we find a small but important kernel of truth: the Constitution should not 
interfere with the personal integrity of individuals.  That principle has 
great importance in the First Amendment context, because it facilitates 
people’s engagement in the process of collective self-determination.  But 
the principle’s limits reveal many fallacies in present First Amendment 
doctrine.  Courts should not allow property owners to exclude political 
speakers from otherwise expansive invitations for the public to use 
shopping malls or buy advertising time simply because the property 
owners are not the government.  Courts should not allow employers to 
fire employees for speaking out politically simply because the employers 
are not the government.  Although the needs of public discourse compel 
courts to avoid interfering with the news media’s editorial decisions, they 
should not allow media corporations to consolidate control over people’s 
access to information.  Because all of these actions degrade political 
debate, they all offend the First Amendment.
This article implicates numerous questions that require further 
examination.  The task of defining the political expression to which I urge 
courts to extend special constitutional protection remains challenging, as 
does the task of determining the boundaries, if any, outside which my 
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proposal should not operate.   I have made no effort to address every 
practical question courts would need to confront when invoking the First 
Amendment against nongovernmental actors.   Most broadly of all, my 
proposed reconceptualization of the public-private distinction in 
constitutional law would alter the outcomes of numerous disputes 
involving other constitutional rights.  In the necessarily narrow sphere 
where I have situated my argument, however, altering the operation of the 
public-private distinction would make sense and bring important benefits.  
Absent some specific reason to limit the First Amendment’s reach in a 
particular circumstance, the Court should enjoin nongovernmental 
interference with wartime political debate.
